Distinctively different: a new approach to valuing architectural amenities by Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. & Holman, Nancy
  
Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt and Nancy Holman 
Distinctively different: a new approach to 
valuing architectural amenities 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Ahlfeldt, Gabriel M. and Holman, Nancy (2017) Distinctively different: a new approach to valuing 
architectural amenities. The Economic Journal . ISSN 0013-0133 
 
© 2016 Royal Economic Society 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66241/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: April 2016 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
Gabriel M. Ahlfeldt & Nancy Holman 
Distinctively Different: A New Approach to 
Valuing Architectural Amenities 
Abstract: We propose a method to estimate the capitalised value of the architectural design quality of an area. 
Our economic design premium is identified by spatially differentiating property prices and design quality within 
neighbourhoods and comparing the differences across neighbourhoods. We apply our method to 48 conserva-
tion area neighbourhoods in England in which we analyse around 7900 property transactions and interview 
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deviation increase in our index of distinctive design. Our results suggest that this effect is at least partially driven 
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Forthcoming in Economic Journal 
 
Architectural beauty can be considered a local public good – no one can be excluded from the 
utility derived from looking at an appealing building, nor does the architecture deteriorate as 
more people enjoy the view. These characteristics have straightforward implications for the so-
cial efficiency of private investment decisions. If there is a positive non-marketed architectural 
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externality, investments into architectural quality will be suboptimal if left to free markets. As 
with most local public goods and spatial externalities it is therefore easy to rationalise planning 
policies that correct for a market failure. In fact, various planning policies aim at preserving or 
creating public spaces of particular heritage value or architectural beauty. In England conserva-
tion is regulated under the 1953 Historic Buildings and Monuments Act, which allows for the list-
ing and preservation of individual buildings, with the 1967 Civic Amenities Act and later the 1990 
Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act regulating areas of architectural and his-
toric interest. Many other nations have similar policies that afford protection to individual build-
ings or neighbourhoods that are deemed by society, and supported by law, of being particularly 
significant in their historical character or architectural appearance. In Europe these policies are 
broadly managed under the Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe 
(The Granada Convention, 1985). Reflecting its federalist system, historic preservation in the 
United States is enabled under the National Historic Preservation Act, with individual states and 
municipalities affording varying degrees of protection for buildings deemed to have heritage 
value.  
The downside of many spatial planning policies that seek to correct for market failures is an in-
terference with private decisions that can lead to unintended economic costs. To name a few ex-
amples, planning systems around the world have been challenged on the grounds of limiting sup-
ply of housing and office space, creating affordability problems and reducing productivity (e.g. 
Brenner and Mühlig, 2013; Capasso et al., 2013; Cheshire and Hilber, 2008; Cheshire et al., 2015; 
Glaeser et al., 2005; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2014). More specifically, many have blamed planning 
restrictions in England with creating an economic paradox of rapidly rising house prices (which 
have in the last 15 years tripled in England and quadrupled in London) and historically low con-
struction levels (Cheshire, 2014). The potential consequences of supply-restrictive policies have 
been argued to be “socially explosive and economically traumatic” (Hilber, 2015) and an issue so 
big that “[…] no politician dares touch it” (Wolf, 2015).  
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively Different 3 
 
Against this background robust evidence on actual or potential benefits of land use planning is 
crucial for the economic justification of existing planning policies, but such evidence is generally 
scarce.1 The policies that seek to correct for a market failure in the preservation or delivery of 
well-designed buildings described above are a particularly illustrative example. Similar to green 
belts, sometimes argued to be among the main drivers of the affordability crisis (Cheshire, 2014), 
such policies limit the extent to which developers can respond to demand and, thus, add to  the 
scarcity of space. The economic rational in favour of these policies obviously rests on the assump-
tion that an architectural externality exists. To date, however, there is limited quantitative evi-
dence that substantiates this claim. This lack of evidence can to some extent be attributed to chal-
lenges involved in detecting effects of architectural design on the economic value of a location. 
For one thing, it is difficult to separate the design effect from other correlated locational factors, 
e.g. better infrastructure, quality of public services, or natural amenities. For another, quantifying 
architectural quality is difficult. Metrics that would allow differentiating the design quality of dif-
ferent built environments are not readily available. We aim to advance the literature by proposing 
a methodology that engages with both these challenges. The paper applies this methodology to 
the illustrative example of conservation areas in England, but we stress that the methodology can 
be implemented in a variety of contexts.  
To assess the economic value of an aesthetically appealing built environment we make use of a 
spatial variant of the difference-in-difference approach. The first difference is taken across spatial 
boundaries within neighbourhoods. The second difference is taken across neighbourhoods. The 
first differences remove features that are similar within small neighbourhoods, e.g. accessibility 
to the city centre, transport infrastructures, natural amenities or good schools. The second differ-
ences remove all features that differ systematically across boundaries that separate different 
                                                             
1  Some studies suggest that the costs of planning are large compared to the associated benefits (Albouy 
and Ehrlich, 2012; Cheshire and Sheppard, 2002) 
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types of areas within a neighbourhood. Examples include tax deductibility of maintenance costs, 
subsidies for renovation work or additional planning control that may be associated with a loca-
tion in a zone of special architectural interest.  
We argue that conservation areas in England are particularly amenable to the proposed method-
ology. Boundaries of conservation areas are purposely drawn to protect areas that have “…special 
architectural or historic interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to preserve or 
enhance” (Civic Amenities Act, 1967 §1). English Heritage2 describes ‘special architectural’ or 
‘historic interest’ broadly to encourage more localised interpretations of heritage, but urges Local 
Planning Authorities (LPAs) to ensure that they are “…able to articulate the special interest and 
support the designation with evidence from some form of historic characterisation” (English 
Heritage, 2012). It is therefore reasonable to expect that the design character within such a des-
ignated area will differ significantly from the area just outside the conservation area. At the same 
time, areas at both sides of the boundary can be assumed to be similar in most other respects.  
As an outcome measure of economic value we concentrate on observed property prices, which 
should reflect the value buyers attach to all property characteristics, including the architectural 
value of a property itself and the area. With this approach we build on a long tradition of research 
on capitalisation effects of local public goods that dates back to Oates (1969) at least.3 In taking 
differences in property prices within neighbourhoods we draw from the regression discontinuity 
design literature (e.g. Basten and Betz, 2013; Dell, 2010; 2008; Lalive, 2008) and, in particular, 
work that has exploited discontinuous changes at spatial boundaries (Gibbons et al., 2013). We 
                                                             
2  Also known as the Historic Buildings and Monuments Commission for England, English Heritage is an 
executive Non-Departmental Public Body sponsored by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.  
Their role is to advise government on heritage issues in England.  Recently (2015) English Heritage was 
broken into two separate organisations with English Heritage retaining the remit to look after historic 
buildings and monuments and Historic England advising on policy and grants.   
3  The capitalisation literature covers a wide range of topics, including public transport (Gibbons and 
Machin, 2005), schools (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2004), or sports stadia (Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos, 2014).   
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exploit the discontinuity in design character of the built environment that arises when one 
crosses the boundaries of conservation areas. We similarly exploit discontinuities in the view 
from outside conservation areas onto buildings inside conservation areas that arise where other 
buildings obstruct the views. We adopt the common identifying assumption in the literature that 
unobserved (non-design) attributes change smoothly across these boundaries. 
To obtain a measure of the spatial differences in design character across conservation area 
boundaries within neighbourhoods, we conduct quantitative interviews with residents living in 
these conservation areas. Among other questions we ask them to rank the distinctiveness of their 
area relative to nearby areas. The questions are asked in such a way that the responses can be 
aggregated to quantitative indices that can be matched to the spatially differentiated property 
prices. We also collect a relatively wide range of individual characteristics and use these to com-
pute an index of relative design quality that is adjusted for interviewee characteristics. 
Comparing the within-neighbourhood differences in property prices and design quality (first dif-
ference) across neighbourhoods (second difference), we find a causal design capitalisation effect 
of about 6.6% (about £16k in 2003 prices) associated with one standard deviation increase in our 
preferred index of distinctive design. Being in an area that, on average, is reported as distinctive 
as opposed to neither distinctive nor non-distinctive area increases property value by as much as 
18.6%. In a complementary analysis we show that a one standard deviation increase in our pre-
ferred design score increases the relative share of population holding a university degree by 3.2 
percentage points and the relative yearly median income by close to £2k, which is in line with 
design-based sorting. Controlling for the income, education and ethnic mix reduces the design 
capitalisation effect by about 18%. A collateral finding of our analysis is a negative regulatory 
effect of a property’s location in a conservation area of about 10%, although the effect is not as 
robust as the design effect. Also, the positive effect of the (preserved) distinctive design exceeds 
the regulatory effect for the vast majority of conservation areas in our sample.  
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The conservation area design capitalisation effects discussed above reflect the benefits of occu-
pying a distinctive building and a property location near to other distinctive buildings. We also 
provide a variety of estimates suggesting the presence of a view externality. The design effect 
persists if we identify from those structures that are the least likely to possess a character that is 
representative for a conservation area, those developed after WWII and before designation. A 
design effect also exists when a comparison is made between properties located outside conser-
vation areas with and without a view onto buildings inside conservation areas. Finally, the design 
effect for properties close to the centres of conservation areas is larger than for properties close 
to the boundaries of conservation areas, which are less exposed to design externalities. Yet, we 
likely underestimate of the external value of design quality as we exclude potential benefits to 
people living further away and visiting the areas. The important implication from these findings 
is that planning policies capable of solving the free-market coordination problem related to the 
architectural externality could potentially deliver sizable economic benefits.  
In general terms we contribute to a literature that has assessed the amenity value of cities (e.g. 
Albouy, 2009, 2012; Blomquist et al., 1988; Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2004; Gyourko and Tracy, 
1991; Tabuchi and Yoshida, 2000) or neighbourhoods within cities (e.g. Brueckner et al., 1999; 
Carlino and Coulson, 2004; Cheshire and Sheppard, 1995; Ioannides, 2003). This literature has 
argued that the consumption value of cities has become increasingly important for the attraction 
of a highly skilled labour force and, hence, the economic success of cities (Carlino and Saiz, 2008; 
Glaeser et al., 2001). In using the economic value embedded in property prices as an outcome 
variable, we relate to a vast literature that has estimated capitalisation effects of local public 
goods or policies (e.g. Cellini et al., 2010; Dachis et al., 2012; Dehring et al., 2008; Eriksen and 
Rosenthal, 2010; Gibbons and Machin, 2005; Oates, 1969) or housing externalities (e.g. Autor et 
al., 2014; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Schwartz et al., 2006). Our study specifically contributes to 
a literature that has looked into design related capitalisation effects, e.g. internal or external cap-
italisation effects related to proximity to iconic architecture on residential property prices 
(Ahlfeldt, 2013; Ahlfeldt and Kavetsos, 2014; Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2009) and/or the effects of 
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building design quality on office rents (Fuerst et al., 2011; Gat, 1998; Vandell and Lane, 1989). 
The closest connection arguably exists to research that has analysed internal and external capi-
talisation effects of historic landmark buildings (Ahlfeldt and Maennig, 2010; Asabere et al., 1994; 
Clark and Herrin, 1997; Coulson and Lahr, 2005; Coulson and Leichenko, 2004; Lazrak et al., 
2010; Leichenko et al., 2001; Listokin et al., 1998; Noonan and Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer and 
Millerick, 1991), and especially Koster et al. (2014) who provide compelling evidence of a pre-
mium associated with a view onto conservation areas in the Netherlands.4 Compared to the afore-
mentioned studies, our analysis is unique in combining a strong control for potentially correlated 
location effects with intuitively interpretable design metrics to which the associated economic 
value can be mapped explicitly. 
1 Empirical Strategy 
Throughout the paper we distinguish between two central effects: 1) a policy capitalisation effect, 
which is the effect of legal incentives (e.g. tax deductibility of maintenance cost or subsidised ren-
ovation work) and restrictions (maintenance obligations and limited rights to alter the external 
appearance of a property) that often exist in zones of special architectural interest on the market 
price of a property; and 2) a design capitalisation effect, which originates from the quality of the 
architecture of a building as well as the nearby buildings. We further distinguish three types of 
design capitalisation effects. First, an internal effect, which is the effect of a building’s own archi-
tectural features on its price regardless of whether these are interior (e.g. wooden floors, carved 
ceilings) or exterior (e.g. shape of the structure or materiality of the facade) features. Second, an 
external view effect, which is associated with the aesthetic (dis)utility derived from a direct view 
onto other buildings’ architecture. This effect is similar to positive effects associated with a view 
on mountains or the sea (Jim and Chen, 2009) or the negative effects of views that are obstructed 
                                                             
4  Our analysis is also broadly connected to some recent analyses of the political economy of design related 
planning (Ahlfeldt et al., 2014; Cheshire and Dericks, 2014; Holman and Ahlfeldt, 2015). 
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by wind farms (Gibbons, 2015). Third, an external visiting effect, which corresponds to the capi-
talised benefit of living relatively close to attractive buildings so that the design amenity can be 
enjoyed when purposely or accidently passing through.5 
In this section we propose an empirical strategy that can be used to estimate the causal effect of 
the design quality of an area on the market value of properties. We propose a spatial variant of 
the difference-in-difference methodology, the rudiments of which we set out in more detail in 
Section 1.1. In the first difference, we spatially differentiate property prices and design indices 
across conservation area boundaries within neighbourhoods. In the second difference, we com-
pare the differentiated price and design indices across neighbourhoods. Our strategy is primarily 
designed to separate the design effect from the policy effect, but we also offer some complemen-
tary approaches to estimate the external view effect specifically. We further lay out how this strat-
egy can be taken to data in general and how specifically we apply it to a set of conservation area 
neighbourhoods in the Greater London region.  
1.1  Framework 
The starting point of our strategy is the assumption that in spatial equilibrium all costs and ben-
efits associated with residing in a property of a certain type and at a certain location must capi-
talise into property prices. With this assumption we build on a long tradition of research that 
dates back to Oates (1969) and Rosen (1974) at least, which has assumed that residents are fully 
mobile and there is perfect spatial competition. We believe that this assumption is particularly 
plausible in our case as we generally identify from spatial variation at a very fine spatial scale. We 
assume that the market price (P) of a property is fully described by vectors of non-design related 
structural (X) and locational (L) components, a regulatory component (r) that can make a prop-
                                                             
5  Our use of the terminologies policy effect, internal effect, external effect, view effect and visiting effect is 
roughly consistent with Ahlfeldt & Maennig (2010), Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos (2014), and Koster et al. (2014). 
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erty more or less attractive (taxes, subsidies, height restrictions, zoning, etc.), and a design com-
ponent (d). For convenience we assume a semi-log relationship, which has proven to suit actual 
data in a vast empirical hedonic house price literature.  
ln(𝑃𝑧,𝑛) = 𝑋𝑧,𝑛𝑏 + 𝐿𝑧.𝑛𝑐 + 𝛿𝑟𝑧,𝑛 + 𝛽𝑑𝑧,𝑛  (1) 
, where b and c are vectors of implicit prices of non-design related housing and location attributes, 
and 𝛽 and 𝛿 are the implicit prices of the design and regulatory components. We index neighbour-
hoods by n, and zones within neighbourhoods by z. We assume that each neighbourhood consists 
of two type of zones 𝑧 = (1,2) which are internally homogenous in design character. The differ-
ence in prices between zones 𝑧 = 1 and 𝑧 = 2 in each neighbourhood n is fully described by the 
differences in all non-design structural and locational attributes, regulatory features and the de-
sign component. 
ln(𝑃𝑧=1,𝑛) − ln(𝑃𝑧=2,𝑛) = (𝑋𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝑋𝑧=2,𝑛)𝑏 + (𝐿𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝐿𝑧=2,𝑛)𝑐 + 𝛿(𝑟𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝑟𝑧=2,𝑛) +
𝛽(𝑑𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝑑𝑧=2,𝑛)   (2) 
We now make two assumptions that are critical for our identification and the interpretation of 
our estimates as causal effects. First, we assume that non-design related locational attributes such 
as accessibility to the city centre, transport infrastructures, natural amenities or good schools are 
the same within both zones in a neighbourhood, i.e. 𝐿𝑧=1,𝑛 = 𝐿𝑧=2,𝑛. In practice, this will most 
likely be true directly at the boundary that separates two zones. Second, we allow both types of 
zones to be subject to differing regulatory regimes, but assume that the differences between the 
two type of zones are constant across neighbourhoods so that 𝛿(𝑟𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝑟𝑧=2,𝑛) = 𝛼. Various spa-
tial policies such as renewal areas, enterprise zones, or conservation areas fit with this assump-
tion as long as privileges, restrictions and enforcement are comparable within an administrative 
unit such as a district, city or country. 
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Throughout this paper we will represent spatial differences in any variable y between zones 
within a neighbourhood as ∆𝑦𝑛 = 𝑦𝑧=1,𝑛 − 𝑦𝑧=2,𝑛. Under the assumptions made, equation (2) 
then collapses to: 
∆ln𝑃𝑛 − ∆𝑋𝑛𝑏 = 𝛼 + 𝛽∆𝑑𝑛  (3)  
To estimate equation (3) and obtain a causal estimate of the design capitalisation effect we re-
quire substantial variation in within-neighbourhood design quality ∆𝑑𝑛 across neighbourhoods 
n. It will be empirically helpful if within-neighbourhood variation in design quality stems from 
discontinuous changes in neighbourhood character at spatial boundaries so that the unobserved 
component can be controlled for more easily. It is also necessary that any spatial policy affecting 
only a specific type of zone within a neighbourhood is implemented uniformly across neighbour-
hoods. There are various settings that potentially comply with these requirements. As an exam-
ple, spatial discontinuities in design character may arise at natural barriers such as rivers if a 
neighbourhood did not grow across the barrier for a sufficiently long time. Another source of dis-
continuous variation in architectural style could be disasters such as earthquakes, fires or bomb-
ings, if the affected areas were rebuilt in a new style. Abrupt changes in architectural design can 
also result from policy interventions, e.g. at the boundaries between zones that were developed 
at different times or to different standards as a result of master planning. Finally, buildings ob-
structing views onto architecturally more or less desirable parts of a neighbourhood provide a 
natural source of discontinuous variation in design externalities. Acknowledging this variety of 
potential applications, we argue that conservation areas in England are a particularly amenable 
to the proposed methodology.  
First, the boundaries of conservation areas are purposely drawn to protect coherent areas of dis-
tinctive character, which stand out relative the rest of the neighbourhood and under best practice 
scenarios are supported by a conservation area appraisal that provides an evidence base to sub-
stantiate the designation. Under §69 of the 1990 Planning (Listed Building and Conservation Ar-
eas) Act, LPAs are charged with periodically reviewing their territories to determine if any new 
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areas are worthy of designation based on special architectural or historic interest. It is, therefore, 
sensible to separate neighbourhoods in which conservation areas have been designated into 
zones that have been designated on the grounds of being distinctive and the rest of the neigh-
bourhood, and to expect a sharp discontinuity in the appearance of the built structure at the 
boundary of the conservation area. 
Second, conservation areas can vary greatly in architectural style. In our survey, areas ranged 
from neighbourhoods with a preponderance of Georgian and Regency properties to areas of Vic-
torian and Edwardian terraces to 1930s inter-war suburban estates. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to expect that the difference in the design amenity of conservation areas relative to the surround-
ing areas ∆𝑑𝑛 varies substantially across neighbourhoods. 
Third, the legal treatment of properties in conservation areas is generally similar in England. 
Owners face heightened levels of restrictions on what they may or may not do with their property. 
It is a criminal offence to totally or substantially demolish any building within a conservation area 
without first seeking consent from the LPA. In cases where alterations to the property require 
planning permission, owners are also required to apply for Conservation Area Consent and appli-
cations are determined based on the enhancement and protection of the area. Restrictions typi-
cally entail control over demolition and the cutting or removal of trees of a specific size. Unlike 
North America, properties inside conservation areas in England do not benefit from specific fund-
ing or tax breaks.  
2 Data and Institutional Setting 
2.1  Sampled Conservation Areas 
As of 2011 there were some 9,800 conservation areas in England, which are identified as having 
“special architectural or historic interest, the character or appearance of which is desirable to 
preserve or to enhance” (Section 69). Our sampling strategy was to include conservation areas 
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with varying levels of deprivation as described by 2007 ward level deprivation indices and con-
servation areas located in both inner and outer London boroughs.  All areas selected were resi-
dential in character. We then randomly selected 24 areas with relatively high levels of deprivation 
and 24 with low levels, and 27 conservation areas within inner London boroughs and 21 located 
in outer London. The exact locations of the surveyed conservation areas are shown in Figure A1 
in the online appendix. Given the very localised notion of heritage, it is no wonder that our 48 
conservation areas also varied in style from the more common Victorian housing developments, 
to Regency, Georgian, Edwardian and Inter-war estates. Many of the areas, like St Marks (Hack-
ney) and Bowes Park (Haringey), were the result of speculative development whilst others like 
Brentham Gardens (Ealing), the Cuckoo Estate (Ealing), and Clyde Circus (Haringey) were for-
mally planned. Properties in these conservation areas range from bungalows and low-density de-
velopment in places like the Mayfield (Redbridge) to more dense terraced housing (North Kil-
burn, Brent), to substantial villas St (Matthias, Richmond) to Regency terraces (Oakhill, Kingston). 
All of the areas reflect a combination of distinctive public or private buildings (e.g. churches, li-
braries or shopping arcades), open spaces, trees or street patterns, which set them apart from 
surrounding neighbourhoods. 
2.2 Property Data 
We use transactions data related to mortgages granted by the Nationwide Building Society (NBS) 
between 1995 and 2010. For our selected conservation area neighbourhoods, the data for Eng-
land comprise around 7,900 observations and include the price paid for individual housing units 
along with detailed property characteristics.6 These characteristics include floor space (m²), the 
type of property (detached, semi-detached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, 
the number of bedrooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. 
                                                             
6  For England as a whole the Nationwide data set contains 1,088,446 transactions, approximately 10% of 
all transactions. 
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There is also some information on the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold). Importantly, the 
data set is geo-referenced (within the British National Grid coordinate system) so that it is possi-
ble to merge the transaction data to locational attributes in GIS (Geographic Information System). 
A comparison to the land registry data set, which contains the universe of transactions, but lim-
ited property characteristics, suggests that the Nationwide data set is representative for our study 
area (see Section 2.4 and Figure A6 in the online appendix). 
2.3 Locational Data 
Merging property coordinates with an electronic map of 8,167 conservation areas in England pro-
vided by English Heritage, it was possible to calculate distances to conservation area borders and 
to determine whether a property is located inside or outside of these borders in any of the con-
sidered neighbourhoods using a geographic information system (GIS). We further compute dis-
tances to the nearest Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty, Natural Nature Reserve, lake, river, 
coastline, bus stop, railway track, London Underground station as well as the average key stage 2 
school test score weighted by distance from the respective schools. A detailed description of the 
construction and the sources of these locational and neighbourhood variables is provided in the 
online appendix to Ahlfeldt et al. (2014). As neighbourhood characteristics we consider the 2005 
median income (from Experian) as well as the share of population holding an academic degree, 
shares of various ethnic groups and a Herifindahl index of ethnic segregation (all from the 2001 
census). We also use a georeferenced data set of individual crimes (Anti-social behaviour, prop-
erty crime, violent crime, theft) that occurred between and 2010 and 2014 from the Metropolitan 
Police Crime Mapping to compute various density measures separately for each zone inside and 
outside a conservation area in each neighbourhood. 
To define what we will refer to as the view area of a conservation area, we begin by drawing a 
25m buffer around a conservation area in GIS. This buffer roughly corresponds to the width of 
half a street plus one house. While locations within this buffer in the neighbourhoods virtually 
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always offer a view onto the conservation area as the view is just across the street, there are in-
stances where open spaces such as parks or playing fields facilitate wider views. To account for 
such wider views, we overlay the conservation area and the 25m buffer with aerial photographs 
and manually adjust the buffer where appropriate. Figure A2 in the online appendix provides an 
illustration of how the view impact areas were defined. 
2.4 Residential survey 
In total, we surveyed 526 residents in the sampled conservation areas. Surveys were conducted 
face-to-face and the sample was drawn such that homeowners and both private and social renters 
were included. There were 53 questions in the survey covering topics ranging from de-
mographics, level of community involvement, attitudes toward the area in terms of likes and dis-
likes, attitudes toward the planning system, experiences with planning applications, experiences 
with objecting to applications, etc. Questions were both multiple choice and discursive allowing 
for longer responses to gauge more fully resident’s opinions about living in their neighbourhood 
and about planning regulation. The quantitative data from these interviews was input into statis-
tical software and analysed. 
3 Econometric Specifications 
Most of our empirical work relies on the estimation of three econometric specifications. With the 
first specification we seek to estimate the differences in property prices across conservation area 
boundaries by neighbourhood, controlling as comprehensively as possible for other factors. The 
estimated spatial price differences correspond to the left-hand side of equation (3) and will be 
used in neighbourhood-level analyses, in particular in graphical illustrations. The second econo-
metric specification shares similarities with Mincerian wage regressions and is used to correct 
reported relative design quality (∆𝑑𝑛 in equation 3) for observable interviewee characteristics. 
The third econometric specification is our baseline specification, which uses individual property 
transactions and the adjusted spatially differenced design index to obtain an estimate of 𝛽. 
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Throughout our econometric specifications, our approach to control for unobserved locational 
factors is inspired by the spatial boundary discontinuity design (BDD), which is a special case of 
the more general RDD. In identifying design capitalisation effects, we concentrate on property 
transactions that fall within a 250m buffer inside and outside a conservation area boundary, an 
area that we refer to as neighbourhood. Identification generally stems from variation across spa-
tial boundaries within neighbourhoods and is conditional on spatial trends that control for unob-
served factors that change smoothly across the boundaries. We note that it is likely that these 
trends not only wash out non-design locational factors, but also external visiting effects, which 
presumably decay smoothly in space. Our methodology is suitable, in principle, to detect policy 
effects, internal design effects and external view effects.  
3.1 Price Differences 
To estimate the mix-adjusted difference in property prices across two sides of the boundary of a 
conservation area within a neighbourhood we use the following specification: 
ln⁡(𝑃𝑗,𝑛,𝑡) = 𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑛𝜔𝑛 + 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛𝜌𝑛 + 𝐵𝑗,𝑛𝛾𝑛 + 𝑋𝑗,𝑡𝑏 + (𝜇𝑛 × 𝜏𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡  (4) 
, where Pj,n,t is the transaction price of a property j selling at time t in neighbourhood n. Each 
neighbourhood n contains one conservation area. We control for the typical non-design related 
characteristics in the vector X where 𝑏 is the respective vector of implicit prices. The variables 
considered include structural characteristics such as age, floor space, number of bathrooms and 
bedrooms, etc. as well as a relatively wide range of location characteristics such as distance to 
rivers, underground stations, average school quality, etc.  
We control for arbitrary shocks that are specific to any neighbourhood in any year using interac-
tions of year (𝜏𝑡) and neighbourhood (𝜇𝑛)⁡fixed effects. 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛 is a vector of neighbourhood spe-
cific running variables. Each variable in the vector denotes the distance from a property j to the 
conservation area boundary within a neighbourhood n, taking positive values outside and nega-
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tive values inside the conservation area in neighbourhood n, and a value of zero outside neigh-
bourhood n. Similarly, 𝐶𝐴𝑗,𝑛 is a vector of neighbourhood specific indicator variables that takes 
the value of one if 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛 < 0 and zero otherwise. It is possible that properties just outside a 
conservation area benefit from a view onto properties located inside a conservation area. At this 
stage we control for possible view effects using neighbourhood-specific buffers 𝐵𝑗,𝑛, which take 
the value of one if 0 < 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛 < 50m and zero otherwise. In our baseline capitalisation equation 
(in 4.3) we will engage more specifically with external view effects. 
We interpret the estimates of 𝜔𝑛 as neighbourhood-specific differences in prices between zones 
inside and outside conservation area right at the boundaries. These estimates control for observ-
able property and location characteristics and correspond to ∆ln𝑃𝑛 − ∆𝑋𝑛𝑏 in equation (3) under 
the assumption that all unobserved non-design characteristics change smoothly in space. We de-
note them by ∆ln?̂?𝑛 in equations and ∆ ln price (adjusted) in graphs and refer to them as relative 
premia or differenced prices elsewhere in the paper. Since all control variables in X are rescaled 
to have a zero mean within neighbourhoods, it is immediate to derive percentage price effects 
(𝑒∆ln?̂?𝑛 − 1) as well as absolute price effects for the average property (𝑒∆ln?̂?𝑛 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑛 , where 
?̂̅?𝑛 is the mean across the year x neighbourhood fixed effects within neighbourhood n (Halvorsen 
and Palmquist, 1980). 
3.2 Design Differences 
Quantifying the design value of an area is obviously challenging, as the quality of design is inher-
ently subjective. Moreover, suitable data, even of subjective character, is difficult to obtain. To 
compute an index of relative design quality (∆𝑑𝑛) in the spirit of equation (3) we conduct inter-
views with residents living in conservation areas asking them how they would rank the distinc-
tiveness of the area they are living in relative to nearby areas on the following scale:  
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Optional answers  Numeric equivalent 
Not at all distinctive -2 
Non-distinctive -1 
Neither distinctive nor non-distinctive ±0 
Distinctive +1 
Very distinctive +2 
As listed above, we assign numeric values to each of the optional answers so that for an individual 
respondent i living in neighbourhood n we obtain an index value ∆?̃?𝑖.𝑛 = (−2,−1,0,1,2). We pre-
sume that by asking residents about the “distinctiveness” of their area, we minimise the influence 
of normative judgements and personal tastes as respondents are not asked to reflect upon the 
subjective beauty of their area, but rather how different it is to other neighbourhoods. Our meas-
ure is in line with policy guidance that suggests conservation areas should reflect local distinc-
tiveness (English Heritage, 2012). To evaluate how sensitive our results are to the wording in the 
design questionnaire, we also ask a similar question where we replace distinctiveness with at-
tractiveness. In a third question we ask residents explicitly how attractive the buildings in the 
neighbourhood are to look at. Our presumption is that each of the resulting indices are compo-
sites of a quasi-objective design differential ∆𝑑𝑛 and an idiosyncratic component that is driven by 
the respondent’s tastes and attitudes. To obtain an estimate of the former we run the following 
Mincer type fixed effects regressions: 
∆?̃?𝑖.𝑛 = 𝐹𝑖𝑔 + 𝜑𝑛 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑛⁡   (5) 
, where 𝐹𝑖 is a vector of variables capturing socio-demographic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, 
education, income) as well variables that are supposed to capture preferences for heritage-re-
lated attributes of the area (e.g. “aware of CA status” or “would consider moving to another CA”), 
and 𝜖𝑖,𝑛⁡ is an error term. We recover the neighbourhood fixed effects 𝜑𝑛 from the estimation of 
equation (5) as our estimate of the difference in design quality between the conservation area 
and the rest of a neighbourhood. We refer to this estimate as ∆?̂?𝑛 in equations, ∆ design score 
(adjusted) in graphs and adjusted differenced design score elsewhere in the paper. Since all con-
trol variables have a mean of zero, this relative design score reflects how a person with average 
characteristics in our sample perceives the relative design quality of a conservation area.  
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3.3 Design Capitalisation 
Our baseline design capitalisation model is a variation of equation (4), which incorporates the 
differenced design scores recovered form equation (5): 
ln⁡(𝑃𝑗,𝑛,𝑡) = 𝛽
𝐶𝐴(𝐶𝐴𝑗 × ∆?̂?𝑛) + 𝛽
𝑉(𝑉𝑗 × ∆?̂?𝑛) + 𝛾
𝐵(𝐵𝑗 × ∆?̂?𝑛) + 𝛼
𝐶𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑗 + 𝛼
𝑉𝑉𝑗
+ 𝛼𝐵𝐵𝑗 +⁡𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛𝜌𝑛 + 𝑋𝑗𝑏 + (𝜇𝑛 × 𝜏𝑡) + 𝜀𝑗,𝑛,𝑡 
(6) 
, where 𝑉𝑗 is an indicator variable, which is equal to one if a property is at a location outside a 
conservation that offers a view onto buildings inside a conservation area (the view area intro-
duced in Section 2.3), and zero otherwise. 𝐵𝑗, unlike in specification (4), is not neighbourhood-
specific and takes the value of one if a property is within 50m on the outside of any conservation 
area. All other variables are as defined above. In particular, 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗,𝑛, 𝑋𝑗𝑏, and⁡(𝜇𝑛 × 𝜏𝑡) serve the 
same purpose as in specification (4).  
Intuitively, this specification allows the premium associated with being located inside a conser-
vation area to vary in the design quality of this area relative to the rest of the neighbourhood. 
Formally, the first derivative with respect to CA, which corresponds to crossing the boundary be-
tween the zones in a neighbourhood holding all other factors constant, illustrates that equation 
(6) provides a spatial differences estimate of the policy and the design capitalisation effect in the 
spirit of equation (3): 
𝜕 ln𝑃𝑖,𝑛,𝑡
𝜕𝐶𝐴𝑖
= 𝛼𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽𝐶𝐴∆?̂?𝑛.  
If the regulatory cost of being located within a conservation area is significant, we expect 𝛼𝐶𝐴 to 
be negative. 𝛽𝐶𝐴 in turn captures the composite of the internal design effect as well as the external 
view effect inside conservation areas. In perfect analogy, 𝛽𝑉 gives a spatial differences effect of 
the pure external view effect outside conservation areas. This assumes that within a neighbour-
hood the internal design quality of buildings in the view area is the same as for other buildings 
outside the conservation areas. Therefore, it is only the external design effect originating from 
the buildings inside the conservation areas that distinguishes buildings inside the view area. The 
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assumption seems justifiable in practice because the boundaries of conservation areas are pur-
posely drawn to separate the distinctive buildings inside conservation from the non-distinctive 
buildings outside.  
The interaction term 𝐵𝑗 × ∆?̂?𝑛 serves two purposes. First the term controls for unobserved loca-
tional factors that are correlated with the design variable ∆?̂?𝑛 within a very small area. This 
strengthens the identification of 𝛽𝑉 because this setting implies that the comparison is being 
made between properties with and without a view onto conservation area buildings within a 
small buffer of no more than 50m width. Secondly, the estimate of 𝛾𝐵 is interesting because it can 
be interpreted as a placebo test. This is because under the assumptions made there should be no 
design capitalisation effect beyond the view area. 
A notable feature of specification (6) is that it is estimated at the level of transactions, but the 
identifying variation in our design measures is at the level of neighbourhoods. The key advantage 
of using the micro-data in the estimation is that it allows analysing the design effects within con-
servation areas, within view areas, and the placebo buffer areas at the same time. An unintended 
collateral, however, is that neighbourhoods are somewhat arbitrarily weighted by the number of 
transactions they contain. Since our conceptual unit of observation (in equation 3) is the neigh-
bourhood, we weight observations by the inverse of the number of transactions in a neighbour-
hood in our preferred specification to remove this effect. We report all key-estimates with and 
without weighting of observations. 
Another collateral of the same feature of specification (6) is that significance levels may be in-
flated. We respond to this concern by clustering standard errors on neighbourhoods in our bench-
mark specifications. There is the additional concern that our relative design score is a “generated 
regressor” (Pagan, 1984), which we address in a bootstrapping procedure. We first draw boot-
strap (with replacement) samples from the first stage (specification 4). Using the recovered fixed 
effects from the bootstrapped first-stage in the second stage (specification 6) we then also block 
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively Different 20 
 
bootstrap (clustering at the neighbourhood level) the second stage. Across a range of specifica-
tions we find very similar standard errors in the clustered and bootstrapped models. Consistently, 
the bootstrapped standard errors turn out to be marginally smaller than the clustered OLS esti-
mates. Therefore, we generally report the OLS clustered standard errors as the more conservative 
estimates. However, we report the baseline estimates with bootstrapped standard errors here 
(Table 3, column 10) and a range of further central estimates with bootstrapped standard errors 
in the online appendix (Table A11). 
We note already at this stage that above and beyond the use of alternative weighting schemes and 
standard errors discussed above, we subject our baseline estimates to a number of further ro-
bustness check. We use alternative approaches to detecting architectural externalities, experi-
ment with different design measures, conduct several falsification tests, address sorting effects, 
further restrict the identifying variation to locations near the boundaries and allow for variation 
in hedonic implicit prices, heterogeneity in the effects of macroeconomic factors and planning 
legislation, and a non-linearity in the design capitalisation effect. 
4 Results 
4.1  Estimated Differenced Prices 
We begin by exploring the variation in adjusted differences in prices across conservation area 
boundaries estimated according to specification (4), the differenced prices or conservation area 
premia. We plot these premia in absolute (right) and relative (left) terms as well as for models, 
which include (solid lines) and exclude (dashed lines) boundary distance trends. In keeping with 
intuition, the models excluding spatial trends produce estimates that are marginally larger. Other 
than this, the distributions look fairly similar. We focus on our preferred estimates that are con-
ditional on trends in what follows.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, properties just inside a conservation area boundary are, on average, 
about 7.3% (£8,902) more expensive than properties just outside. On average, thus, the positive 
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design effect seems to exceed a potentially negative policy effect. More importantly for a cross-
neighbourhood comparison is the degree of variation. The estimated premia vary as much as from 
-32.0% to +131.12% or -£80,865 to +£111,588. Standard deviations with 24.2% or £37,936 are 
relatively high. 15 out of 48 conservation areas achieve a negative premium. There is, thus, sig-
nificant variation in differenced prices to be attributed to differenced design scores. A full list of 
the differenced prices by neighbourhood is provided in Table A1 in the online appendix.  
At the heart of our empirical strategy is the comparison of differenced prices derived from actual 
market transactions and a reported measure of differenced design quality collected in quantita-
tive surveys. To cross-validate the econometric method and the interview-based collection pro-
cess, we compute an index of relative “expensiveness” based on a question that was otherwise 
phrased exactly as those inquiring about the design features of primary interest. As shown in Fig-
ure 2, home owners seem to be well aware of the price premium (or discount) their area achieves. 
While it is not surprising that renters are less informed about purchasing prices in their area, the 
degree of disconnect between the perceived expensiveness and the estimated differenced prices 
is striking. 
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Fig. 1.  Distribution of Relative and Absolute Conservation Area Premia 
 
Notes:  Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ Ln price (adjusted) is obtained by regressing the natural log of 
sales price against structural and locational controls, year x neighbourhood fixed effects, distance from CA 
boundary x neighbourhood effects where indicated in the legend as “conditional on trends”, interaction 
terms between a dummy for 50m external buffer around CA boundaries and neighbourhood effects; and 
interaction terms between a CA dummy and neighbourhood effects (equation 4). The latter (∆ln?̂?𝑛) are 
plotted in the left panel. ∆ Price plotted in the right panel is computed as [exp(∆ln?̂?𝑛) − 1] × ?̂̅?𝑛, where ?̂̅?𝑛 
is the mean of the estimated year x neighbourhood fixed effects across years within a neighbourhood. Ver-
tical lines are the means of the distributions. 
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Fig. 2.  Estimated and Reported Differenced Prices by Tenure 
 
Notes:  Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ Ln price (adjusted) is obtained by regressing the natural log of 
sales price against structural and locational controls, year x neighbourhood fixed effects, distance from CA 
boundary x neighbourhood effects where indicated in the legend as “conditional on trends”, interaction 
terms between a dummy for 50m external buffer around CA boundaries and neighbourhood effects; and 
interaction terms between a CA dummy and neighbourhood effects (equation 4). Reported expensiveness 
is the mean of individual scores ranging from -2 (not at all expensive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 
(very expensive relative to surrounding areas) within a neighbourhood.  
4.2  Estimated Differenced Design Scores 
In Table 1 we examine how the reported differenced design scores correlate with individual char-
acteristics of the respondents and some observable design related characteristics of the areas 
they live in. Relative to the Victorian character, which is the most frequent style and forms our 
base category, Georgian and Interwar styles are more likely to be reported as attractive. Also, 
planned estates carry a premium in the reported attractiveness scores (1). This pattern is also 
apparent when we ask an alternative question explicitly about the attractiveness of the buildings 
(5) in the area. Georgian style areas are also more likely to be reported as distinctive (3). It is 
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important to note, however, that most non-Victorian styles apply to no more than a couple of 
conservation areas, so some care is warranted with the interpretation.  
Tab. 1. Design Score Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Attractiveness relative 
to surrounding areas 
Distinctiveness relative 
to surrounding areas 
Attractiveness  
of buildings 
Female (dummy) -0.124** 
(0.059) 
-0.171** 
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.067) 
0.021 
(0.075) 
-0.034 
(0.080) 
-0.029 
(0.080) 
Age (years) -0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
British (dummy) 0.041 
(0.106) 
0.003 
(0.108) 
0.143 
(0.104) 
0.126 
(0.113) 
0.074 
(0.109) 
0.026 
(0.091) 
White (dummy) 0.083 
(0.110) 
-0.028 
(0.109) 
-0.031 
(0.098) 
-0.140 
(0.113) 
0.033 
(0.102) 
-0.114 
(0.098) 
In full-time em-
ployment (dummy) 
-0.195** 
(0.089) 
-0.101 
(0.096) 
-0.284*** 
(0.104) 
-0.186* 
(0.101) 
-0.103 
(0.079) 
-0.045 
(0.070) 
Income (£/year) 0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
University degree 
(dummy) 
-0.170* 
(0.098) 
-0.178* 
(0.104) 
-0.049 
(0.135) 
-0.059 
(0.133) 
0.010 
(0.125) 
-0.028 
(0.104) 
Homeowner 
(dummy) 
0.045 
(0.135) 
0.076 
(0.143) 
0.008 
(0.124) 
0.115 
(0.135) 
0.033 
(0.130) 
0.106 
(0.115) 
Years stayed at 
property 
-0.015* 
(0.009) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Aware of CA status 
(dummy) 
0.183* 
(0.096) 
0.029 
(0.096) 
0.346*** 
(0.124) 
0.237* 
(0.139) 
0.225** 
(0.104) 
0.115 
(0.094) 
Would consider 
moving to a CA 
0.210*** 
(0.071) 
0.195** 
(0.080) 
0.164** 
(0.076) 
0.134 
(0.086) 
0.115* 
(0.068) 
0.111 
(0.072) 
Georgian 0.239** 
(0.110) 
 
 
0.496*** 
(0.091) 
 
 
0.367*** 
(0.115) 
 
 
Regency 0.006 
(0.157) 
 
 
0.113 
(0.156) 
 
 
0.111 
(0.215) 
 
 
Edwardian 0.028 
(0.116) 
 
 
0.020 
(0.132) 
 
 
-0.124 
(0.110) 
 
 
Interwar 0.381*** 
(0.100) 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.149) 
 
 
0.325** 
(0.129) 
 
 
Planned 0.262** 
(0.098) 
 
 
0.133 
(0.105) 
 
 
0.242* 
(0.133) 
 
 
Constant 0.761*** 
(0.091) 
0.874*** 
(0.042) 
0.758*** 
(0.090) 
0.870*** 
(0.039) 
1.009*** 
(0.122) 
1.114*** 
(0.039) 
Neighb. fixed ef-
fects 
NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Observations 524 524 524 524 521 521 
R2 0.087 0.231 0.097 0.212 0.084 0.319 
Notes:  Baseline architectural style category is Victorian. All individual variables have a mean of zero. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered on neighbourhoods. A hand full of missing values in age, income and 
degree have been set to zero and denoted by 0,1 indicator variables. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In columns (2), (4) and (6) we replace the conservation area characteristics with neighbourhood 
fixed effects. These models provide a strong control for unobserved conservation area character-
istics and, thus, more credible estimates of the effects of individual characteristics. Only few indi-
vidual characteristics turn out to exhibit significant partial correlations with reported differenced 
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design scores. Women and degree holders tend to rank their area somewhat lower in terms of 
attractiveness. Individuals with higher incomes or those who are in full-time employment tend to 
rank their areas somewhat lower in terms of distinctiveness. Individuals who reported to be likely 
to move to another conservation area were more likely to rank their area as attractive while in-
dividuals who were aware of the conservation area status of their areas were more likely to re-
port it as distinctive.  
Fig. 3. Between and Within Neighbourhood Distribution of Differenced Design Scores 
 
Notes:  Unit of observation is neighbourhood in the left panel and interviewee in the right panel. Left panel com-
pares design scores across neighbourhoods. Raw values are means of the reported scores ranging from -2 
(not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas) 
within a neighbourhood. Adjusted scores are the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual charac-
teristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Right panel compares differences in the reported 
individual scores to the respective neighbourhood mean. Raw values use unadjusted reported data. Ad-
justed design scores are the residuals recovered from the estimation of equation (5). 
Figure 3 plots the distribution of the reported differenced design scores across neighbourhoods 
(left) as well as the distribution of individual deviations from the neighbourhood means (right). 
The adjusted differenced design scores (left) are the estimated fixed effects from Table 1 (column 
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4). The adjusted individual deviations (right) are the residuals from the same models. The be-
tween distributions of differenced design scores peak close to one, which implies that on average 
the sampled conservation areas were considered as distinctive and attractive compared to 
nearby areas. Only one conservation area received a negative differenced distinctiveness score, 
implying that the area was perceived as not distinctive. There are quite a few areas that are at the 
margin of being distinctive or attractive or at the margin of being very distinctive or very attractive. 
The standard deviation in the adjusted differenced distinctiveness score across neighbourhoods 
is 0.39. Within conservation areas the distribution of individual scores is concentrated around 
the mean score of the area. Close to 50% of the adjusted individual scores are within a ±0.5 range 
of the adjusted mean conservation area score. Only about 19% of the individual scores are outside 
a ±1 windows. There seems to be some consensus on the relative design quality of an area. 
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Fig. 4. Design Scores vs. Year of Designation and Density of Listed Buildings 
 
Notes: Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ design score (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling 
for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ design scores can 
range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to sur-
rounding areas). Ln density of listed buildings is the natural log of the number of listed buildings in a CA 
normalised by the geographic size of the CA. Year of designation and an electronic map of listed buildings 
were provided by English Heritage.  
In Figure 4 we make an attempt to externally validate our design scores. In line with the model of 
the political economy of conservation area designation by Ahlfeldt et al. (2014), conservation ar-
eas characterised by higher (relative) design quality were designated earlier. We also find that 
areas with a higher density of listed buildings tend to be perceived as more distinctive. Together, 
these findings suggest the perceptions of distinctive design by residents and the planners who 
designate conservation areas and listed buildings are reasonably well aligned. From a more tech-
nical perspective, Figure 4 suggests that designation date and listed building density may serve 
as predictors of the differenced design scores. 
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4.3  Design Valuation: Graphical Illustration 
We argue that by exploiting discontinuous variation in property prices at the boundaries of con-
servation areas, where the design character of the neighbourhood changes abruptly, we are able 
to control for many unobserved locational characteristics and achieve a strong identification of 
the design effect. Figure 5 illustrates the nature of the variation in prices that we exploit in iden-
tifying the design effect. In each of the four panels we plot residual prices, which control for ob-
servable structural and locational characteristics, against our running variable, distance from the 
conservation area boundary. We also illustrate how a linear trend with an intercept at the con-
servation area boundary approximates the distribution of mix-adjusted transaction prices. Fi-
nally, we report an estimate of the price change at the boundary, the boundary effect (standard 
errors in parenthesis).  
The four panels distinguish between neighbourhoods with different differenced design scores. 
The key-insight that emerges from Figure 5 is that the existence of a price discontinuity at the 
boundary critically depends on the magnitude of the differenced design score. The estimated 
boundary effect is essentially zero within neighbourhoods where the reported differenced dis-
tinctiveness scores are near to or below zero (∆ distinctiveness < 0.25). An about 4% boundary 
effect exists for the group of neighbourhoods where the conservation area has a moderate design 
advantage over the rest of the neighbourhood (0.25 < ∆ distinctiveness < 0.75). The boundary 
effect further increases to about 9% and 12% for the groups of neighbourhoods where the con-
servation areas were reported as being distinctive relative to surrounding areas 0.75 < ∆ distinc-
tiveness < 1.25 and those which lean towards being very distinctive (∆ distinctiveness > 1.25).  
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively Different 29 
 
Fig. 5. Discontinuities in Prices at Conservation Area Boundaries by Distinctiveness 
 
Notes:  Residual prices are from regressions of the natural log of sales price against structural and locational con-
trols, year fixed effects and neighbourhood fixed effects. Circles denote means of residual prices within 12.5 
meter distance bins within categories of neighbourhoods defined based on their adjusted ∆ distinctiveness 
score (the recovered fixed effects from equation (5). Raw ∆ distinctiveness ranges from -2 (not at all dis-
tinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Solid red lines 
illustrate the results of separate regressions (for each of the ∆ distinctiveness categories) of residual prices 
against distance from the CA boundary and a dummy variable equalling one for negative distance values. 
The unit of observation in these regressions is the bins (observations are weighted by the number of trans-
actions within a bin). Boundary effects are the coefficients on the dummy variables from these regressions 
(standard errors in parentheses) and correspond to the gaps between the solid and the dashed lines. 
In the online appendix, we show that a similar pattern in residual prices exists when we concen-
trate on properties whose structures were developed after 1945, but before the conservation 
area in a given neighbourhood was designated (Figure A5). We argue that these properties are 
the least likely to possess the characteristics that led to designation, thus any conservation area 
effect is less likely to originate from an internal design effect and more likely to originate from an 
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external view effect.7 This interpretation is in line with a positive discontinuity at the boundary 
of the view area, which is larger in neighbourhoods with more distinctive conservation areas as 
shown in the same figure. We also note that we find a similar pattern to Figure 5 when using Land 
Registry data, which contains the universe of transactions, but only limited property characteris-
tics (online appendix Figure A6). 
Figure 5 suggests that there is a positive relationship between differences in prices across con-
servation areas and the respective differences in design quality. In Figure 6 we explicitly plot this 
relationship, which directly corresponds to equation (3), using estimates of differenced prices 
from specification (4) and estimates of differenced design scores from specification (5). Despite 
the two labelled outliers Ladbroke and Minet Estate the correlation is reasonably well defined. 
While we stress that our preferred parametric estimates are based on specification (6), which we 
discuss next, there are some noteworthy insights that emerge from the simple and transparent 
estimates reported below the scatter plots.  
There is a significantly negative intercept as expected (α in equation 3). The implication is that 
the regulatory constraint in conservation areas, if not compensated by high design quality, depre-
ciates the value of a property by about 10% or £15.7k. A one-step increase on our five-step scale, 
e.g. from being neither distinctive nor non-distinctive to being distinctive, all else equal increases 
prices by about 22%. In standard deviation terms, a one unit increase in our differenced distinc-
tiveness score increases differenced prices by about 7.8%. At a differenced distinctiveness score 
of 0.5 (just in the middle between being reported as being neither distinctive nor non-distinctive 
and being distinctive relative to surrounding areas) the regulatory effect and the design effect 
cancel out each other. In an average neighbourhood with a differenced distinctiveness score of 
                                                             
7  Since the Edwardian, Georgian, Interwar, Regency, and Victorian styles that characterise the conserva-
tion areas in our sample predate the cut-off date it is unlikely that these properties possess the charac-
teristics that led to designation. In fact, the reason for protecting conservation areas is to prevent un-
sympathetic (re)development, which is not in keeping with the area’s character. 
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0.85 the predicted positive net capitalisation effect is close to the means of the distributions in 
relative and absolute premia depicted in Figure 1 (≈7% or £8.9k).  
Fig. 6. Differenced Prices vs. Differenced Design Score 
 
Notes: Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ Ln price (adjusted) is obtained by regressing the log of sales price 
against structural and locational controls, year x neighbourhood fixed effects, distance from CA boundary 
x neighbourhood effects, interaction terms between a dummy for 50m external buffer around CA bounda-
ries and neighbourhood effects; and interaction terms between a CA dummy and neighbourhood effects  
(specification 4). The latter are the neighbourhood specific relative premia (∆ln?̂?𝑛) plotted in the left panel. 
∆ Price plotted in the right panel is computed as (𝑒∆ln?̂?𝑛 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑛 , where ?̂̅?𝑛 is the mean of the estimated 
year x neighbourhood fixed effects across years within a Neighbourhood. ∆ Design score (adjusted) is the 
neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation 
(5). Reported ∆ design scores can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 
(very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Outliers are labelled if internally studentised residual 
(from distinctiveness models) is larger than two. Parametric fit from ∆ distinctiveness model. * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01 (robust standard errors). 
4.4  Design Valuation: Baseline Econometric Analysis 
In Table 2 we report estimates of specification (6), our preferred design capitalisation model. We 
use all available transaction throughout columns (1-4). In doing so, we exclude neighbourhood 
specific boundary distance effects in models (1) and (2) and weight observations according to the 
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively Different 32 
 
inverse of the number of transactions in a neighbourhood in (2) and (4). This is to give equal 
weights to neighbourhoods, which provide the variation from which we identify the design capi-
talisation effect. Our preferred baseline model is in column (4).  
In line with the results discussed above, the estimates reported in columns (1-4) consistently 
point to a positive and significant capitalisation effect of distinctive design when the comparison 
is made across conservation area boundaries and neighbourhoods (CA x ∆ distinctiveness). The 
magnitude of the estimated conservation area distinctiveness effect tends to be larger in models 
in which we apply our weighting scheme and in models that feature boundary distance effects. 
The premium for being located in a conservation area increases by 18.3% for each one-step in-
crease in our differenced distinctiveness score, e.g. a conservation area that is distinctive relative 
to surrounding areas as opposed to a conservation area that is neither distinctive nor non-distinc-
tive. In terms of standard deviations, a one unit increase in our differenced distinctiveness score 
increases differenced prices by 6.6%. This design effect is close to the one found in Figure 6 
(7.8%).  
Consistently, we find no positive and no statistically significant design effect if a similar differ-
ence-in-difference comparison is made taking first differences across the outer boundaries of the 
buffer zone instead of conservation area boundaries (Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness). We interpret this 
result as a successful placebo test. Instead, we find a positive design effect when the same com-
parison is made taking first differences across the boundaries of the view areas (View x ∆ distinc-
tiveness) within the buffer zones, although the effect is only statistically significant at conven-
tional levels in our baseline model (4). In terms of magnitude the effect is about half the size of 
conservation area distinctiveness effect. We cannot conclude, however, that the difference in 
magnitudes reflects the internal design effect because the external view effect is likely larger 
within conservation areas.  
In model (5) we replicate (3) restricting the sample to structures constructed after 1945, but be-
fore the conservation area in a given neighbourhood was designated. In this model we find a large, 
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positive, and statistically significant conservation area distinctiveness effect (CA x ∆ distinctive-
ness). We, once again, argue that this comparison is more likely to capture an external view effect 
than in the baseline model because the buildings included in the sample are the least likely to 
possess the particular design features that constitute the character of a conservation area. When 
we include boundary distance effects in column (6) the conservation area distinctiveness effect 
(CA x ∆ distinctiveness) increases as before. But the standard errors increase even more, likely the 
result of the combination of a limited number of observations and a relatively demanding speci-
fication. Still, we argue that the results from this alternative approach to detecting spillovers sub-
stantiate the impression that an external view effect exists. 
Tab. 2. Design Capitalisation Effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  All transactions  Non-historic pre-des-
ignation buildings 
  Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price  Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
 0.137*** 
(0.049) 
0.160*** 
(0.049) 
0.134** 
(0.055) 
0.168** 
(0.064) 
 0.230** 
(0.110) 
0.302 
(0.354) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
 0.056 
(0.047) 
0.074+ 
(0.050) 
0.061 
(0.049) 
0.081* 
(0.048) 
 0.112 
(0.202) 
0.139 
(0.210) 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness 
(adjusted) 
 -0.031 
(0.049) 
-0.020 
(0.053) 
-0.042 
(0.048) 
-0.028 
(0.059) 
 -0.054 
(0.157) 
0.106 
(0.199) 
Conservation area (CA)  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
View (dummy)  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Buffer (dummy)  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
CA distance x neigh. effects  - - Yes Yes  - Yes 
Weighted  - Yes - Yes  Yes Yes 
N  7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871  1,127 1,127 
r2  0.913 0.915 0.917 0.919  0.959 0.965 
Notes:  Unit of observation is transactions. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood  effects controlling for 
individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ design scores can 
range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to sur-
rounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation 
areas. View is a dummy variable identifying transactions outside conservation areas with a view on build-
ings inside conservation areas. Buffer is dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter 
buffer area outside conservation areas. Controls include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, 
the number of bedrooms, whether a property is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heat-
ing, is a detached house, is a semi-detached house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural 
park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the near-
est river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-
weighted measure of average test scores at local schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neigh-
bourhood specific distance to conservation area boundary trends (0 at boundary). Observations in (2) and 
(4-6) are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a neighbourhood. Non-historic pre-des-
ignation buildings are developed after 1945, but before designation of the conservation area in a neigh-
bourhood. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods.  + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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We note that we report a much broader range of parameter estimates for the key-models in Ta-
ble 2 in the online appendix (Table A2). The estimates of the implicit prices of structural and lo-
cational characteristics, where significant, offer little surprise. The perhaps most interesting pa-
rameter estimate not reported here is the one on the conservation area dummy (CA). While, in 
line with the estimates reported in Figure 6, the parameter estimate is consistently negative, is 
not statistically significant. It is still noteworthy, though, that the effects of CA and CA x ∆ distinc-
tiveness jointly imply that the negative regulatory effect and the positive design effect cancel out 
at a differenced distinctiveness score of about 0.4, which is very close to the 0.5 we find based on 
the estimates reported in Figure 6.8 
4.5 Design Valuation: Robustness and Complementary Evidence 
As announced in the empirical strategy section, we subject our baseline estimates to a number of 
robustness checks, which we briefly summarise here. For most robustness checks reported in 
Table 3 there is a complementary section providing additional estimates and explanation in the 
online appendix (Section 4). 
In column (2) we replicate our baseline model using non-adjusted differenced distinctiveness 
scores reported by the interviewees. The estimated design effects slightly increase, revealing that 
our results are not driven by the adjustments made to account for individual interviewee charac-
teristics (using specification 5). In column (3) we use the differenced attractiveness score instead 
of distinctiveness score as a design measure. The results are qualitatively similar, but the view 
area design effect becomes insignificant. We find a similar pattern when we use the variable 
coded based on how attractive buildings are to look at (see Table A6 in the online appendix). 
These results reveal sensitivity to the wording in the design questionnaire and the importance of 
seeking formulations that abstract from personal tastes and preferences.  
                                                             
8  A Wald-test comfortably rejects that both parameters are jointly equal to zero. 
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In column (4) we allow the implicit prices of all structural and locational characteristics to vary 
across conservation area boundaries and in the differenced distinctiveness score. This specifica-
tion allows for a complementarity in the valuation of design and observable non-design features. 
It is demanding robustness check that significantly reduces the degrees of freedom. While the 
view area distinctiveness effect remains within the same range, it becomes statistically insignifi-
cant. The conservation area distinctiveness effect is reduced, but remains significant.  
In column (5) we add socio-economic controls capturing the neighbourhood composition in 
terms of income, education and ethnicity to control for sorting. We also add various crime density 
measures (varying across the conservation area border) to accommodate the possibility that 
criminal activity or anti-social behaviour could be concentrated in areas with specific design char-
acteristics. The conservation area distinctiveness effect is reduced by about 18%. Otherwise the 
results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar. As shown in the online appendix, the re-
sults remain relatively robust even if we allow the design effect to vary in socio-economic char-
acteristics (Table A7). In complementary estimates reported in the online appendix (Table A8) 
we show that differences in crime densities across conservation area boundaries are not signifi-
cantly correlated with the differenced distinctiveness score. In contrast, a one standard deviation 
increase in the differenced distinctiveness score increases the differenced share of population 
holding a university degree by 3.2 percentage points and the differenced yearly median income 
by close to £2k (see Figure 7). Together, these results suggest that there is amenity-based sorting 
as predicted by e.g. Brueckner et al. (1999) but that the quantitative effect on the design capitali-
sation effect is limited. 
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Fig. 7. Income and Education vs. Design Quality 
 
Notes: Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ Income and ∆ degree shares are expressed as differences between 
the means across transactions within inside 250m buffers around a conservation areas boundary and out-
side 250m buffers around a conservation areas boundary. Raw income data merged to transactions are 
Experian estimates of the median household income in a census ward. Degree shares merged to transac-
tions are from the 2001 census and available at the output area level. ∆ design score is the neighbourhood 
effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ 
design scores can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive 
relative to surrounding areas). 
In column (6) we control for whether an “Article 4” direction is in place for a conservation area, 
which gives special planning control to authorities. Moreover, we allow the regulatory cost (α in 
equation 3) to arbitrarily vary across local authorities (boroughs) by adding CA x Local Planning 
Authority fixed effects. In column (7) we similarly allow arbitrary macroeconomic shocks to im-
pact heterogeneously on areas inside and outside conservation areas by adding CA x year effects. 
Although especially model (6) is very demanding since the number of local authorities with 21 is 
large relative to the number of neighbourhoods from which we identify (48), the results tend to 
be reasonably robust.  
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In column (8) we address the concern that it is potentially the same households who reported 
design scores and bought properties inside conservation areas. Unobserved preference shocks 
could therefore introduce an endogeneity problem. Building on the evidence provided in Figure 4 
we use the year of designation of a conservation area and the density of listed buildings inside a 
conservation area, both interacted with the conservation area dummy, as instruments for the in-
teraction of the CA dummy and the relative distinctiveness score (CA x ∆ distinctiveness score). In 
the reported estimates from a model excluding boundary distance effects the conservation area 
design effect remains large and significant. We report a wider range of instrumental variable es-
timates in the online appendix (Table A9). Models including boundary distance effects generally 
show coefficient estimates within the same range of the baseline model. But the estimates are not 
significant, likely because of a weak instrument problem (Kleinbergen Paap F-statistic < 6.5). 
In column (9) we employ an alternative approach to ensure that identification of conservation 
area distinctiveness effect originates from changes in prices at conservation area boundaries. In-
stead of controlling for boundary distance effects, we weight observations according to their 
proximity to the boundary. We use a standard Gaussian kernel with a bandwidth selected accord-
ing to Silverman (1986).9 The conservation area distinctiveness effect remains close to the bench-
mark estimate, showing little sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth (see Table A10 in the online 
appendix). In column (10), finally, we report the baseline model with standard errors computed 
according to the bootstrap procedure discussed towards the end of Section 3.3. As previewed in 
that section, the standard errors are marginally smaller than in the baseline model. Table A11 in 
the online appendix compares a broader range of approaches to computing standard errors, re-
vealing that the ones reported here are the most conservative. 
                                                             
9  Formally, the distance kernel weight is defined as 𝑤𝑗𝑛 =
1
𝜆√2𝜋
exp (−
1
2
(
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑗𝑛⁡
𝜆
)
2
)⁡, where DISTjn is the 
distance from conservation area boundary n, and the bandwidth is set as 𝜆 = 1.06 × 𝜎𝑁−
1
5. 
Ahlfeldt / Holman – Distinctively Different 38 
 
So far, because of the limited number of neighbourhoods providing within-neighbourhood varia-
tion in design quality, we have remained restrictive with respect to the functional form of the 
price-design relationship. In Figure 8 we present a transparent attempt to explore a potential 
non-linearity. We compare the linear fit from Figure 6 (the solid line) to higher-order polynomial 
fits and a non-parametric locally weighted regression (LWR) approximation. The higher-order 
polynomial fits seem to point to a concave relationship in semi-logarithmic scale (left), which is 
in line with diminishing marginal utilities from design. However, the non-parametric LWR esti-
mates suggest that this concavity is driven by a small number of outliers in sparsely populated 
areas, which polynomials tend to chase after. Moreover, the concavity disappears altogether 
when differenced prices are expressed in absolute terms (right). In the online appendix, we pre-
sent estimates of a semi-non-parametric version of the baseline capitalisation specification (6). 
We find that the mean and median of the distribution of marginal conservation area distinctive-
ness effects is slightly above the baseline estimate while the distribution of marginal view area 
distinctiveness effects is centred on a value slightly below the baseline estimate. The marginal 
effects are generally within a narrow range for the vast majority of observations. Thus, we con-
clude that there is little evidence in support of a non-linearity in the design capitalisation effect, 
although we caution against over-interpreting this result given the limited number of neighbour-
hoods from which we identify. 
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Fig. 8.  Distinctiveness Effect: Non-Linear Approximations 
 
Notes:  Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ Ln price is obtained by regressing the log of sales price against 
structural and locational controls, year x neighbourhood fixed effects, distance from CA boundary x neigh-
bourhood effects, interaction terms between a dummy for 50m external buffer around CA boundaries and 
neighbourhood effects; and interaction terms between a CA dummy and neighbourhood effects. The latter 
are the neighbourhood specific relative premia (∆ln?̂?𝑛) plotted in the left panel. ∆ Price plotted in the right 
panel is computed as (𝑒∆ln?̂?𝑛 − 1) × 𝑒 ?̂̅?𝑛 , where ?̂̅?𝑛 is the mean of the estimated year x neighbourhood fixed 
effects across years within a neighbourhood. ∆ distinctiveness score is the neighbourhood effects control-
ling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ design scores 
can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to 
surrounding areas). Crosses are predicted values from locally weighted linear regressions (LWR) of ∆ ln 
price against ∆ distinctiveness. We run one LWR for each neighbourhood ?̃? weighting all other neigh-
bourhhods using the Gaussian kernel 𝑤𝑛?̃? =
1
𝜆√2𝜋
exp (−
1
2
(
∆?̂?𝑛−⁡∆?̂??̃?
𝜆
)
2
)⁡, where the bandwidth is set as 𝜆 =
1.06 × 𝜎𝑁−
1
5. 
Having discussed a range of empirical exercises supporting our main finding that there is a posi-
tive and sizable valuation of architectural design; we turn to some limitations of the work. Argu-
ably, the main concern is that it is impossible to control for all non-design related structural at-
tributes of properties. In our particular setting this concern is somewhat mitigated since omitted 
variables would have to be correlated with design value in first spatial differences to challenge 
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our main findings.10 Such a relationship could exist if in households’ utility function there was a 
complementarity between (unobserved) non-design characteristics and design characteristics. If 
owners or landlords responded to a higher design value by adding (unobserved) positive non-
design features, our design effect would be overestimated. The imperfect defence we can bring 
up is that NBS data set we use is much richer in terms of property characteristics than many other 
data sets, including the Land Registry data, which reduces the risk of such a bias. A related con-
cern is that non-design locational variables could change discontinuously at conservation area 
boundaries in a way that is correlated with design differences across these boundaries. This con-
cern is mitigated by the fact that conservation area boundaries generally do not coincide with 
administrative boundaries such as school catchment areas. Also, we show that there is little cor-
relation between differenced design and differenced densities of criminal activity and anti-social 
behaviour, which could theoretically be concentrated in areas with specific design characteristics. 
On a more conceptual level, our method cannot distinguish whether the identified valuation of 
distinctive design originates from a consumption value, i.e. households genuinely enjoy distinc-
tive design, or a social value that results from the reputational effect of owning a scarce good. 
These limitations are primarily relevant for the general conclusions of the paper as the scarcity 
value would decline the more a planning system succeeded in creating areas of high design qual-
ity. 
                                                             
10  Systematic differences across conservation area boundaries would affect the estimated regulatory cost, 
but not the estimated design value. 
Tab. 3. Design Capitalisation Effects: Robustness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS 
CA x ∆ design score 0.238** 
(0.092) 
0.177*** 
(0.056) 
0.196*** 
(0.059) 
0.104* 
(0.059) 
0.137** 
(0.054) 
0.122* 
(0.064) 
0.171** 
(0.065) 
0.221*** 
(0.082) 
0.186*** 
(0.038) 
0.168*** 
(0.063) 
View x ∆ design score  0.086* 
(0.050) 
0.088** 
(0.044) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.058 
(0.052) 
0.087* 
(0.045) 
0.081+ 
(0.048) 
0.086* 
(0.048) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
 
 
0.081* 
(0.046) 
Buffer x ∆ design score  -0.007 
(0.059) 
-0.026 
(0.055) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
-0.019 
(0.043) 
-0.031 
(0.059) 
-0.028 
(0.058) 
-0.027 
(0.059) 
0.002 
(0.050) 
 
 
-0.028 
(0.049) 
Design score Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(raw) 
Attractive-
ness (ad-
justed) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
Distinc-
tiveness 
(adjusted) 
CA / View / Buffer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Socio-economic controls - - - - Yes - - - - - 
Crime controls - - - - Yes - - - - - 
CA x controls - - - Yes - - - - - - 
∆ Distinct. x controls - - - Yes - - - - - - 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA dist. x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - - Yes 
Internal buffer x neigh. effects Yes - - - - - - - - - 
CA x LPA effects & Article 4 - - - - - Yes - - - - 
CA x year effects - - - - - - Yes - - - 
View spillover area excluded - - - - - - - - Yes - 
Weighted Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Inv. neigh. 
& CA dist. 
Inverse 
neigh. 
Standard errors Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Clustered Bootstr. 
Kleinbergen Paap F-statistic - - - - - - - 9.873 - - 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) - - - - - - - 0.956 - - 
N 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 7057 7871 
r2 0.920 0.919 0.919 0.923 0.923 0.920 0.919 - 0.942 0.919 
Notes:  Unit of observation is transactions. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual cha racteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5).Raw 
values are neighbourhood means across the scores reported by individuals. Reported ∆ design scores can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very 
distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Attractiveness is defined accordingly. CA / View / Buffer are dummy variables identifying transactions inside conservation areas (CA) / the 
view spillover zone / and a 0-50 m buffer outside CA boundaries. Controls are defined in Table 2 notes. Socio-economic controls include output area income, academic degree share, 
shares of mixed, Asian, black, and Chinese population and a Herfindahl-Index of ethnic neighbourhood composition. Crime controls include density of the following crimes: Anti -social 
behaviour, property crime, violent crime, theft. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to CA boundary trends (0 at boundary) . Internal buffer x neigh-
bourhood effects are neighbourhood effects interacted with a -50-0 meter internal buffer on the inner side of the CA boundaries. CA x LPA effects are local planning authority fixed effects 
interacted with the CA dummy. Article 4 is a dummy indicating that an Article 4 direction is in place. Instruments for CA x ∆ distinctiveness in (7) are year of CA designation and natural 
log of listed building density within the respective CA. Observations are weighted inversely to the number of observations in  a neighbourhood in all models except in (8) where the same 
is multiplied by a kernel function that decreases in distance from the CA boundary on either side (Gaussian kernel, bandwidth  set according to Silverman). Clustered standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. Bootstrapped standard errors are generated by bootstrapping samples of survey respondents (with replacement), placing the recovered 
design fixed effects in block (clustered on neighbourhoods) bootstrapped (with replacement) second-stage price regressions in 1000 replications. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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5 Conclusion 
We have presented a novel method to estimate the economic value of architectural design. Our 
method separates the design effect from correlated location effects by differentiating property 
prices and design character across spatial boundaries within neighbourhoods and comparing the 
differences in property prices and design across neighbourhoods. The applicability of the method 
is not limited to certain empirical settings or architectural styles. The key-requirement is that 
discontinuous variation in design exists along clearly defined boundaries in a number of neigh-
bourhoods. Such discontinuities can arise for a variety of reasons. A non-exclusive list includes 
natural barriers that interrupted urban growth, disasters such as fires, earthquakes or bombings, 
which led to localised reconstruction, master planning, which can produce estates developed to 
particular design standards differentiating them from surrounding areas, or simply major build-
ings, which obstruct views on architecturally more or less desirable parts of a neighbourhood.  
In our implementation of this method we use conservation area boundaries as a source of discrete 
variation in design character. We obtain our indices of capitalised value and design scores using 
a combination of econometric techniques and qualitative methods. The estimated design value is 
large. Our baseline estimate suggests a capitalisation effect of about 6.6% of property value (£16k 
in 2003 prices) associated with a one standard deviation increase in our preferred index of dis-
tinctive design. Being in an area that is reported as distinctive as opposed to being in a neither 
distinctive nor non-distinctive area increases property value by as much as 18.6%. The effect 
seems at least partially attributable to an architectural externality. Our results, thus, provide 
some rationale for planning policies that seek to preserve and enhance the architectural quality 
of the built environment to internalise architectural externalities. Examples naturally include pol-
icies like those discussed here but also could entail encouraging new build projects through mas-
ter planning of larger sites where developers are actively encouraged to internalise externalities 
through design guides.  
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The evidence we provide is particularly relevant in light of an ongoing debate in which panning 
systems have come under pressure for creating costs in form of lower productivity or limited 
supply of office and housing space. We provide some evidence that there may be benefits of land 
use planning that need to be carefully weighed against such costs. Our analysis directly speaks to 
this trade-off in that we demonstrate that the net-effect of regulatory cost and design value is 
positive of the average conservation area, but the net effect can be negative for selected areas that 
are not particularly distinctive. 
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Distinctively Different: A New Approach to 
Valuing Architectural Amenities 
1 Introduction 
This technical appendix provides complementary material not reported in the main paper for 
brevity. The material presented comprises additional detail on data and maps that illustrate the 
spatial setting of our study (Section 2), complementary results that are not essential for the mes-
sage of the main paper but may be of interest to some readers (Section 3), and various robustness 
checks that substantiate the interpretations and conclusions presented in the main paper (Sec-
tion 4). The appendix is not designed to stand alone or replace the reading of the main paper.  
2 Data 
2.1 Conservation Area Locations 
Our sampling strategy was to include conservation areas with varying levels of deprivation as 
described by 2007 ward level deprivation indices and conservation areas located in both inner 
and outer London boroughs. We randomly selected 24 areas with relatively high levels of depri-
vation and 24 with low levels and 27 conservation areas within inner London boroughs and 21 
in located in outer London. Figure A1 maps the resulting sample of conservation areas included 
in our study.  
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Fig A1. Conservation Area Locations 
 
Notes:  Dark shaded areas are the sampled conserveration areas. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
Borough boundaries based on a shapefile from Office for National Statistics.  
2.2 Definition of View Areas 
We refer to the area outside a conservation area from which the buildings inside the conservation 
area are visible as the view area. To approximate the view area of a conservation area we begin 
by drawing an outside 25m buffer area around the conservation area, which is about the width of 
half a street plus one house in a typical neighbourhood. As illustrated in Figure A2a this buffer 
area provides a reasonable approximation of the view area in many circumstances where there 
is a view across the street. In some cases, however, wider views are facilitated by open spaces 
such as parks or playing fields. In such instances we manually adjust the shape of the view area 
using the 25m buffer area as a starting point. For ease of adjustment, we slightly simplify the 
geometry of the 25m buffer (reduce the number of edges) before we adjust the boundaries. Figure 
A2b illustrates an example where a manual adjustment was made to provide a better approxima-
tion of the view area.  
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Fig A2a. View Area 
 
Notes: Cross-hatched area is the conserveration area. Hatched area is the 25m buffer. Thick solid line show the 
view impact area. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
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Fig A2b. View Area 
 
Notes: Cross-hatched area is the conserveration area. Hatched area is the 25m buffer. Thick solid line show the 
view impact area. ESRI topographic map in the background. 
2.3 Conservation Areas and Census Unit Boundaries 
To assess whether building design quality attracts certain types of households more than others 
and to control to some extent of the effects associated with such sorting we match neighbourhood 
characteristics to our data. Such data refer to spatial statistical units whose boundaries are typi-
cally not congruent with conservation area boundaries. We use disposable household income es-
timates by Experian available at the level of lower level super output areas as well as the share of 
population holding an academic degree and various measures of ethnic composition available at 
output area level. For an exemplary conservation area we overlay the different boundaries in Fig-
ure A3. As expected, the conservation area boundaries differ significantly from those of the (su-
per) output areas. However, it is also evident that (super) output areas are sufficiently small to 
ensure that for each conservation area there are at least a couple of (super) output areas with the 
majority of their surface area within the conservation area. It is therefore expected that a com-
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parison of the aggregate of (super) output areas within and outside the boundary of a conserva-
tion area will be informative with respect to the actual differences across the boundary. In merg-
ing the neighbourhood data to our database we proceed as follows. We merge the neighbourhood 
variables to transactions based on the (super) output areas a transaction falls in. To aggregate 
neighbourhood statistics inside and outside the conservation area boundary we make use of the 
allocation of transactions to (super) output areas as an intermediate input. Essentially, we com-
pute the means over transactions inside and outside the conservation area and within the 250m 
buffers. This approach is asymptotically equivalent to a spatial interpolation weighted by popu-
lation as long as turnover is proportionate to population.  
Fig A3. Conservation Areas and Census Unit Boundaries 
 
Notes:  Black thick line is the conserveration area boundary. Thin solid lines are boundaries of lower level super 
output areas. Thin dotted lines are boundaries of output areas. 
2.4 Comparison between Nationwide and Land Registry Data 
Our primary property data relates to mortgages for properties granted by the Nationwide Build-
ing Society (NBS) between 1995 and 2010. Compared to data set compiled and made publicly 
available by the Land Registry, the great advantage of the Nationwide data set is that it includes 
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a broader range of property characteristics such as floor space (m²), the type of property (de-
tached, semidetached, flat, bungalow or terraced), the date of construction, the number of bed-
rooms and bathrooms, garage or parking facilities and the type of heating. There is also some 
buyer information including the type of mortgage (freehold or leasehold). Unlike the Land Regis-
try data, the Nationwide data set, however, does not include the universe of residential transac-
tions. In Figure A4 we analyse how the transaction prices recorded in both data sets compare 
within our study neighbourhoods. In the left panel we aggregate property prices to zones, where 
a zone is either the area outside or inside a conservation area within a neighbourhood. In the right 
panel we compare the distribution of individual transaction prices. The comparison suggests that 
the Nationwide sample is representative for the overall distribution of prices in the market.   
Fig. A4. Comparison of Nationwide Building Society (NBS) Data to Land Registry Data  
 
Notes: Dots in the left panel are natural logs of mean property prices within “conservation area x neighbourhood 
x year cells”. Unit of observation is transactions in the right panel. Kernels are Gaussian.  
3 Complementary Evidence 
3.1 Conservation Area Details 
In Table A1 we tabulate the differenced prices estimated according to specification (4) along with 
the design indices and some additional information by conservation area.  
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Tab. A1. Conservation Area Details 
Conservation area Transactions ∆ Price (adjusted) Survey obs. and ∆ design score (adjusted) Architectural style / 
period 
Planned 
estate N Name In Out Ln points Absolute (£) Obs. Distinct. Attract. Buildings 
1 Aldersbrook 66 59 0.134*** 20123 10 0.8 1.21 1.04 Edwardian Yes 
2 Barnsbury 172 72 0.173*** 28704 10 1.26 1.09 1.56 Georgian, Victorian No 
3 Bowes Park 50 161 0.030** 3870 15 0.41 0.06 -0.03 Victorian No 
4 Brentham Garden Estate 41 35 -0.037* -10476 14 1.48 1.1 1.38 Edwardian Yes 
5 Brockley 181 287 0.097** 13001 15 0.69 1.19 1.36 Victorian Yes 
6 Camberwell Grove 69 117 0.138*** 22639 10 1.29 0.88 1.26 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
7 Canonbury 72 91 0.169*** 35956 10 1.35 1.33 1.62 Victorian Yes 
8 Clapton Square 68 73 0.143*** 19106 10 0.89 0.67 0.4 Victorian No 
9 Clyde Circus 33 135 0.044** 5089 10 0.41 0.24 0.58 Victorian No 
10 Courtfield 67 5 -0.170*** -50079 6 1.32 -0.1 1.04 Victorian Yes 
11 Crabtree 130 68 -0.186*** -45312 20 0.33 0.6 0.84 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
12 Crouch End 232 169 0.074*** 13634 10 1.24 1.23 1.63 Victorian No 
13 Cuckoo Estate 90 105 -0.121*** -17079 1 0.01 0.99 1 Interwar Yes 
14 De Beauvoir 91 13 0.113*** 19557 14 1.34 0.91 1.33 Victorian Yes 
15 Dulwich Village 42 210 0.377*** 85482 10 1.25 1.45 1.15 Victorian, Edwardian Yes 
16 East Canonbury 96 25 -0.263*** -58256 10 0.92 0.83 1.24 Victorian Yes 
17 East India Estate 122 158 0.108*** 12393 11 0.56 0.79 0.93 Victorian, Edwardian No 
18 Fairfield Road 83 27 0.347*** 48806 10 1.02 1.02 1.18 Victorian, Edwardian No 
19 Graham Road and Mapledene 164 25 0.061** 9186 10 0.89 0.82 1.24 Victorian Yes 
20 Hanger Hill Garden Estate 25 20 -0.097*** -17887 14 1.09 1.22 1.64 Interwar Yes 
21 Hatcham 38 87 0.063+ 5673 15 0.77 0.85 1.19 Victorian Yes 
22 Heaver Estate 142 183 -0.001 -199 5 0.88 1.09 1.88 Victorian Yes 
23 Hillmarton 80 109 0.281*** 39855 10 0.51 0.93 0.7 Victorian Yes 
24 Holly Grove 52 98 -0.074*** -12078 10 1.12 1.08 1.41 Georgian, Victorian No 
25 Ladbroke 60 6 0.838*** 111588 16 1.25 0.84 1.44 Regency Yes 
26 Mayfield 31 109 0.245*** 32753 10 0.49 1.42 1.49 Interwar Yes 
27 Minet Estate 39 28 0.574*** 95300 10 0.96 1.32 1.49 Victorian Yes 
28 Muswell Hill 254 108 0.129*** 25888 20 0.85 0.77 1.15 Victorian No 
29 Noel Park 80 94 0.042** 5322 10 0.44 0.79 0.26 Victorian Yes 
30 North Kilburn 40 60 0.100*** 19348 10 1.03 0.58 1.02 Victorian Yes 
31 Oak Hill 43 85 0.006 910 8 0.42 0.62 0.76 Regency, Victorian No 
32 Overcliffe, Gravesend 5 45 -0.386*** -34061 6 -0.58 -0.54 -0.54 Victorian No 
33 Parsons Green 19 29 -0.213*** -61451 6 0.67 0.73 1.31 Victorian Yes 
34 Queens Park Estate 36 77 0.042*** 6972 10 1.43 1.39 1.89 Victorian No 
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Tab. A1. Conservation Area Details 
Conservation area Transactions ∆ Price (adjusted) Survey obs. and ∆ design score (adjusted) Architectural style / 
period 
Planned 
estate N Name In Out Ln points Absolute (£) Obs. Distinct. Attract. Buildings 
35 Ravenscourt and Starch Green 60 209 0.062** 14018 10 0.94 0.93 1.15 Victorian, Edwardian No 
36 Sheen Road, Richmond 38 25 -0.107*** -23624 9 0.93 0.33 0.88 Victorian No 
37 Southborough 27 134 -0.037 -7670 15 0.62 1.27 1.45 Victorian No 
38 St John's Grove 36 118 0.260*** 40703 10 1.04 1.08 1.27 Victorian No 
39 St John's Wood 74 81 0.312*** 61703 10 1.14 1.59 1.45 Vict., Edw., Interwar Yes 
40 St Mark's 57 71 0.156*** 22928 13 1.03 0.45 0.73 Victorian Yes 
41 St Matthias, Richmond 97 13 -0.289*** -80865 16 0.8 0.2 1.06 Victorian No 
42 Swiss Cottage 146 87 0.008 1645 10 0.86 0.81 0.81 Victorian No 
43 Telegraph Hill 139 121 0.002 259 15 1.09 1.49 1.69 Victorian Yes 
44 Tower Gardens 34 30 -0.041** -4503 10 0.47 0.38 0.39 Edwardian Yes 
45 Turnham Green 46 40 -0.234*** -47101 13 0.82 1.09 1.22 Victorian No 
46 Wellesley Road, Chiswick 72 68 0.250*** 46840 10 0.67 0.88 0.85 Victorian Yes 
47 West Putney 64 107 0.057*** 9771 5 0.81 0.69 1.18 Victorian, Edwardian No 
48 Woodgrange Est., Forest Gate 31 60 0.204*** 18953 11 0.76 0.96 1.09 Victorian Yes 
Notes: Transactions give the number of property transactions within an Inside and Outside 250m buffer area from the conservation area boundary. ∆ Price (adjusted) is the price 
difference between the buffer area inside vs. outside the conservation area, controlling for observable property and lo cation characteristics, neighbourhood specific dis-
tance from conservation area boundary trends, and year x neighbourhood effects (equation 4). Survey N is the number of survey observations by conservation area. 
Distinc./Attract./Building stand for distinctiveness/ attractiveness/ buildings are attractive to look at. ∆ design index (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling 
for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ design index ranges from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) 
to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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3.2 Boundary Discontinuities: Complementary Evidence 
The upper panels in Figure A5 compliment Figure 5 in the main paper by showing analogous es-
timates restricting the sample to properties whose structures were developed after 1945, but be-
fore the conservation area in a given neighbourhood was designated. Because of the lower num-
ber of available transactions we limit the comparison to two categories, which are otherwise sim-
ilarly defined as in Figure 5 in the main paper. The key stylised facts are in line with the figure 
reported in the main paper. There is a notable discontinuity at the conservation area boundary, 
which is larger in neighbourhoods where the design differences are larger (right panel). We argue 
that these properties are the least likely to possess the characteristics that led to designation, thus 
any conservation area effect is less likely to originate an internal design effect and more likely to 
originate from an external view effect.  
The lower panels of Figure A5 provide a similar comparison of (all) residual prices across the 
boundaries of our view areas. Because we concentrate on a much smaller area transactions are 
again relatively scarce so that we use the same two categories of within-neighbourhood variation 
in design as in the upper panels. Again, we find a positive discontinuity in residual prices in neigh-
bourhoods where the conservation area has a large design advantage. Perhaps somewhat surpris-
ingly, the discontinuity is negative in neighbourhoods where the differenced distinctiveness score 
is smaller (but typically still positive). This result is somewhat driven by the trend in residual 
prices and needs to be interpreted with some care given the limited number of transactions. The 
key-stylised fact that the (positive) discontinuity in prices is larger where differences in design 
are larger prevails.  
Figure A6 is an exact replication of Figure 5 in the main paper using the Land Registry data set 
instead of our preferred Nationwide data. The general patterns are remarkably similar to Figure 5 
in the main paper. The boundary discontinuities are clearly visible and increase in the differenced 
design scores. Figure A6 is, once more, reassuring in the sense that it suggests that the results are 
not driven by sample selection in the Nationwide data set. 
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Fig. A5.  Discontinuities in Prices at Conservation Area Boundaries by Distinctiveness:  
Externality Models 
 
Notes:  Residual prices are from regressions of the natural log of sales price against structural and locational con-
trols, year fixed effects and neighbourhood fixed effects. Circles denote means of residual prices within 12.5 
(upper panels) or 5 (bottom panel) meter distance bins within categories of neighbourhoods defined based 
on their adjusted ∆ distinctiveness score (the recovered fixed effects from equation (5). Raw ∆ distinctive-
ness can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative 
to surrounding areas). The solid red lines illustrate the results of separate (for each of the ∆ distinctiveness 
categories) regressions of residual prices against distance from the conservation area (CA) or view area 
boundary and a dummy variable taking the value of one for negative distance values. The unit of observation 
in these regressions is the bins (observations are weighted by the number of transactions within a bin). 
Boundary effects are the coefficients on the dummy variables from these regressions (standard errors in 
parentheses) and correspond to the gaps between the solid and the dashed lines. 
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Fig. A6. Discontinuities in Prices at Conservation Area Boundaries by Distinctiveness: Land Registry 
Data 
 
Notes:  Residual prices are from regressions of the natural log of sales price against dummy variables capturing 
property type (detached, semi-detached, terraced vs. flat), whether a property is new, whether a property 
sells as leasehold, year fixed effects and neighbourhood fixed effects. Circles denote means of residual prices 
within 12.5 meter distance bins within categories of neighbourhoods defined based on their adjusted ∆ 
distinctiveness score (the recovered fixed effects from equation (5). Raw ∆ distinctiveness can range from 
-2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). 
Solid red lines illustrate the results of separate (for each of the ∆ distinctiveness categories) re gressions of 
residual prices against distance from the CA boundary and a dummy variable taking a value of one for values 
for negative distance values. The unit of observation in these regressions is the bins (observations are 
weighted by the number of transactions within a bin). Boundary effects are the coefficients on the dummy 
variables from these regressions (standard errors in parentheses) and correspond to the gaps between the 
solid and the dashed lines. 
3.3 Hedonic Estimates 
In Table A2 we present a broader range of parameter estimates from models (3-5) in Table 2 in 
the main paper. In particular, we show the various estimates of the implicit prices of structural 
and hedonic attributes, which were not reported in the main paper to save space.  
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Tab. A2. Hedonic Implicit Prices 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
 All transactions  Non-historic pre-
designation 
 Ln price Ln price  Ln price 
Transaction within conservation area (CA) -0.036 (0.054) -0.071 (0.058)  -0.065 (0.104) 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.134** (0.055) 0.168** (0.064)  0.230** (0.110) 
View impact area -0.048 (0.035) -0.064* (0.035)  -0.108 (0.144) 
View x distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.061 (0.049) 0.081* (0.048)  0.112 (0.202) 
0-50 m distance to CA buffer 0.019 (0.043) -0.002 (0.048)  0.073 (0.124) 
Buffer x distinctiveness (adjusted) -0.042 (0.048) -0.028 (0.059)  -0.054 (0.157) 
Building age (years) 0.001*** (0.000) 0.001*** (0.000)  -0.002 (0.002) 
Floor size (m²) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.000)  0.006*** (0.001) 
New property (dummy) 0.143*** (0.043) 0.158*** (0.040)  0.247 (0.202) 
Leasehold (dummy) -0.102*** (0.022) -0.112*** (0.026)  -0.182*** (0.066) 
Garage (dummy) -0.017*** (0.005) -0.020*** (0.006)  -0.025* (0.013) 
Central heating (dummy) -0.000 (0.003) -0.000 (0.004)  -0.003 (0.008) 
No. of bathrooms 0.033*** (0.010) 0.032*** (0.012)  0.061 (0.053) 
No. of bedrooms 0.082*** (0.007) 0.075*** (0.008)  0.064** (0.026) 
Detached house (dummy) 0.098*** (0.031) 0.079** (0.035)  0.009 (0.092) 
Semi-detached house (dummy) 0.053*** (0.017) 0.055** (0.021)  0.004 (0.091) 
Terraced house (dummy) 0.040** (0.019) 0.033+ (0.022)  0.026 (0.077) 
Distance to nearest Natural Park -0.001 (0.024) -0.013 (0.026)  0.103 (0.071) 
Distance to nearest AONBa -0.034+ (0.022) -0.036 (0.025)  0.069 (0.069) 
Distance to nearest NNRb 0.005 (0.025) -0.009 (0.024)  0.051 (0.068) 
Distance to nearest lake -0.024 (0.024) -0.039 (0.029)  -0.009 (0.066) 
Distance to nearest river 0.006 (0.022) 0.009 (0.022)  -0.028 (0.066) 
Distance to nearest coastline -0.018 (0.022) -0.021 (0.025)  0.014 (0.071) 
distance to nearest bus stop 0.220*** (0.060) 0.153* (0.078)  -0.137 (0.177) 
Distance to nearest railway tracks 0.003 (0.025) 0.024 (0.028)  0.032 (0.080) 
Dist. to nearest London Underground stations -0.013 (0.027) -0.008 (0.027)  0.021 (0.066) 
IDW of Key stage 2 score per MSOA 0.057* (0.033) 0.050+ (0.030)  0.070 (0.063) 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes  Yes 
CA distance x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes  - 
Weighted - Yes  Yes 
N 7,871 7,871  1,127 
r2 0.917 0.919  0.959 
Notes:  Expanded presentation of models reported in Table 2, columns (3-5) in the main paper. Unit of observation 
is transaction. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual charac-
teristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness can range from -2 (not 
at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). CA 
distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to conservation area boundary 
trends (0 at boundary). Observations in (2-3) are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a 
neighbourhood. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p 
< 0.05, *** p < 0.01. a Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty. b National Nature Reserve. 
The results are generally very consistent across specifications and in line with economic intuition. 
Larger properties in terms of floor space, number of bedrooms and bathrooms are more expen-
sive as are detached, semi-detached and terraced houses (as opposed to flats). New properties 
sell at a premium, but among other properties older properties achieve a premium in some pos-
sibly reflecting a premium for historical style and character. Leasehold (as opposed to freehold) 
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is associated with a significant discount as expected. The only surprising parameter estimate 
among the structural characteristics is the negative coefficient of a garage, which indicates that 
properties with a garage are likely to have some unobserved negative features (e.g. unfavourable 
architectural style). Because we identify from variation within very small neighbourhoods where 
many locational attributes should be similar there is generally not sufficient within-neighbour-
hood variation to identify significant effects of locational features. An exception is the average 
key-stage 2 test scores in local school, which increases property prices as expected. The other and 
perhaps more surprising exception is the negative effect of proximity to a bus stop. One interpre-
tation is that this effect is capturing the negative effects associated with a location at a major road 
(e.g. noise, pollution) where busses typically pass through.  
4 Robustness 
4.1 Boundary effects and placebos 
In column (1) of Table 3 in the main paper we control for effects within 50m buffer zones inside 
conservation area boundaries defined for each neighbourhood (Internal buffer x neighbourhood 
effects). The rationale is that if a view externality exists, we expect the conservation area distinc-
tiveness effect to increase in this model because properties located closer to the centre of a con-
servation area should be exposed more intensely to design externalities. In the first three columns 
of Table A3 we gradually increase the size of the internal buffer from 25 to 75m. The conservation 
area distinctiveness effect increases continuously as expected.  
In the last three columns of Table A3 we add similarly increasing external buffers. Because these 
neighbourhood x external buffer effects obviously interfere with view x ∆ distinctiveness effects and 
buffer x ∆ distinctiveness effects we drop those from these models. The decrease in the conserva-
tion area distinctiveness effect from column (4) to (5) comes as a surprise, but otherwise the re-
sults are in line with expectations (larger than the baseline estimate and increasing in buffer size). 
Because the exact view area is difficult to approximate we experiment with different view area 
definitions Table A4. We consider an external buffer around the conservation area of varying 
width, not adjusted buildings and spaces that obstruct or facilitate views (unlike in our baseline). 
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Otherwise the reported models are identical to our baseline model (4) in Table 2 in the main pa-
per. The view area distinctiveness effects tend to be relatively robust and are largest when we 
define the view area as a 25m buffer area outside conservation areas. This result supports the 
starting point of the construction of our variable. The fact that the view area distinctiveness effect 
based on the 25m larger than in our baseline model reveals that our results are not driven by the 
manual adjustments made to the view area boundaries. 
Starting from column (4) in Table A4 we conduct four falsification tests using artificial boundaries 
in Table A5. Model (3) is the same as model (4) in Table A4 and just included for comparison. In 
columns (1) and (2) we shift the conservation area boundaries towards the centre of the conser-
vation areas. In column (4) and (5) we shift the boundaries into the area outside conservation 
areas. As we shift the conservation area boundaries we parallel shift the boundaries of the view 
areas and the buffer areas. The placebo tests generally do not yield positive and significant design 
capitalisation effects. The conservation area distinctiveness effect in (5) is an exception, possibly 
because the artificial conservation area boundaries are close to the actual view area boundaries. 
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Tab. A3. Varying Internal and External Neighbourhood x Buffer Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.217*** 
(0.080) 
0.238** 
(0.092) 
0.260** 
(0.099) 
0.203*** 
(0.040) 
0.172*** 
(0.058) 
0.179* 
(0.091) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.083+ 
(0.050) 
0.086* 
(0.050) 
0.080+ 
(0.049) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) -0.013 
(0.059) 
-0.007 
(0.059) 
-0.004 
(0.060) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA distance x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighbourhood x internal buffer effects Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Neighbourhood x external buffer effects - - - Yes Yes Yes 
Internal / external buffer size (meters) 25 50 75 25 50 75 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
r2 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 
Notes:  Baseline model is model (4) in Table 2 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transaction. ∆ distinctive-
ness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the 
estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to 
surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a 
dummy variable identifying transactions inside CA. View is a dummy variable identifying transactions out-
side CA with a view on buildings inside CA. Buffer is dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0 -50 
meter buffer area outside CA. Controls include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the num-
ber of bedrooms, whether a property is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a 
detached house, is a semi-detached house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the 
nearest area of outstanding beauty, the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, 
the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted 
measure of average test scores at local schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood 
specific distance to CA boundary trends (0 at boundary). Internal (external) buffer x neighbourhood effects 
are neighbourhood effects interacted with an internal (external) buffer on the inner (outer) side of the CA 
boundaries. Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a neighbourhood. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
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Tab. A4. Distinctiveness Effects: Varying View Area Definitions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.166*** 
(0.060) 
0.163** 
(0.061) 
0.165*** 
(0.059) 
0.173** 
(0.065) 
0.161*** 
(0.059) 
0.161** 
(0.060) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.091 
(0.101) 
0.074 
(0.074) 
0.075+ 
(0.050) 
0.116** 
(0.044) 
0.071+ 
(0.046) 
0.098* 
(0.049) 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.009 
(0.057) 
0.005 
(0.059) 
-0.005 
(0.066) 
-0.040 
(0.056) 
-0.030 
(0.071) 
-0.060 
(0.065) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA distance x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View area (meter) 10 15 20 25 30 35 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
r2 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 
Notes:  Baseline model is model (4) in Table 2 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transactions. ∆ distinctive-
ness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the 
estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to 
surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a 
dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation areas. View is a dummy variable identifying 
transactions outside conservation areas with a view on buildings inside conservation areas. Buffer is 
dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside conservation areas. Con-
trols include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a prop-
erty is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached 
house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, 
the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail 
station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local 
schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to conservation area 
boundary trends (0 at boundary). Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in 
a neighbourhood. View area is a buffer of varying width outside conservation areas. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Tab. A5. Distinctiveness Effects: Placebo Conservation Area Boundaries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) -0.213*** 
(0.060) 
-0.040 
(0.088) 
0.173** 
(0.065) 
0.167*** 
(0.052) 
0.013 
(0.049) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.031 
(0.048) 
0.057 
(0.082) 
0.116** 
(0.044) 
0.057 
(0.043) 
0.064 
(0.063) 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) -0.191* 
(0.095) 
-0.127** 
(0.051) 
-0.040 
(0.056) 
0.113*** 
(0.037) 
0.024 
(0.057) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA distance x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Boundaries shifted by (meters) -100 -50 0 50 100 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
r2 0.919 0.918 0.919 0.919 0.918 
Notes:  Baseline model is model (4) in Table 2 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transactions. ∆ distinctive-
ness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the 
estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to 
surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a 
dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation areas. View is a dummy variable identifying 
transactions outside conservation areas with a view on buildings inside conservation areas. Buffer is 
dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside conservation areas. Con-
trols include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a prop-
erty is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached 
house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, 
the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail 
station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local 
schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to conservation area 
boundary trends (0 at boundary). Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in 
a neighbourhood. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.2 Alternative Design Indices 
Table A6 complements columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 in the main paper by applying our baseline 
econometric model (specification 6) including and excluding boundary distance trends to alter-
native design indices. We find that the conservation area design effects are robust to using the 
differenced attractiveness score instead of the differenced distinctiveness score, whether it is ad-
justed for interviewee characteristics or not. The view area design effect, while within the same 
range of the baseline model estimate, is consistently not statistically significant. The results are 
even weaker when we construct our design measure based on the alternative question inquiring 
about how attractive buildings are to look at. We conclude that the results are somewhat sensitive 
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to the wording in the design questionnaire, revealing the importance of using formulations that 
seek to abstract from personal tastes and preferences. 
Tab. A6. Design Capitalisation Effects: Varying Design Indices 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ design index 0.233*** 
(0.069) 
0.196*** 
(0.059) 
0.119** 
(0.050) 
0.096+ 
(0.060) 
0.091+ 
(0.056) 
0.090** 
(0.041) 
View x ∆ design index 0.068 
(0.061) 
0.044 
(0.047) 
0.023 
(0.050) 
0.066 
(0.049) 
0.040 
(0.039) 
0.037 
(0.037) 
Buffer x ∆ design index 0.002 
(0.060) 
0.018 
(0.039) 
0.020 
(0.041) 
-0.061 
(0.050) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
-0.019 
(0.037) 
Design index Attractive-
ness (raw) 
Attractive-
ness  
(adjusted) 
Attractive-
ness  
(adjusted) 
Buildings 
are attrac-
tive to look 
at (raw) 
Buildings are 
attractive to 
look at (ad-
justed) 
Buildings are 
attractive to 
look at (ad-
justed) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neigh. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA dist. x neigh. effects Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All All All All All All 
N 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 7871 
r2 0.919 0.919 0.914 0.919 0.919 0.914 
Note:  Baseline model is model (4) in Table 2 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transactions. Adjusted de-
sign indices are neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estima-
tion of equation (5). Raw values are neighbourhood means across the scores reported by individuals. Re-
ported ∆ design indices can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very 
distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a dummy variable identifying transac-
tions inside CA. View is a dummy variable identifying transactions outside CA with a view on buildings in-
side CA. Buffer is dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside CA. Con-
trols include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a prop-
erty is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached 
house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, 
the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail 
station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local 
schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to CA boundary trends 
(0 at boundary). Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a neighbourhood. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 
0.01 
4.3 Income, Education and Crime 
In column (5) of Table 3 in the main paper we report results of a model including a range of con-
trols for socio-economic characteristics of the resident population and the density of various 
crimes. In column (1) of Table A7 we present the estimated effects of the socio-economic varia-
bles. As expected, property prices tend to be higher where incomes and education levels are 
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higher. The ethnic variables are more difficult to interpret due to collinearity. They are primarily 
included to absorb as many correlated characteristics as possible. Conditional on education and 
income levels as well as various shares of ethnic groups we find that diversity is associated with 
a premium. 
Tab. A7  Design Effects: Controlling for Socio-Economic Composition and Interaction Effects 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
 Ln price  Ln price  Ln price  
CA x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.137** (0.054) 0.131** (0.058) 0.099+ (0.067) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.087* (0.045) 0.086* (0.045) 0.078* (0.043) 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) -0.031 (0.059) -0.033 (0.059) -0.028 (0.057) 
Median Income (2005 in 1000 £) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 0.002** (0.001) 
Degree share (%, output area) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Share of Mixed population at total population 0.062 (0.254) 0.074 (0.258) 0.050 (0.261) 
Share of Asian population at total population 0.129 (0.180) 0.129 (0.180) 0.123 (0.183) 
Share of Black population at total population -0.140 (0.126) -0.141 (0.126) -0.152 (0.127) 
Share of Chinese population at total population -0.033 (0.170) -0.032 (0.171) -0.043 (0.172) 
Herfindahl of ethnic segregation 0.159* (0.089) 0.160* (0.088) 0.145+ (0.089) 
∆ Distinctiveness x ∆ Median Income (in 1000 £)   0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
∆ Distinctiveness x ∆ Degree share (%)   -0.002 (0.003) -0.004+ (0.003) 
CA / View / Buffer dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Crime controls Yes  Yes  Yes  
Distinctiveness x ∆ socio-economic controls -  -  Yes  
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
CA distance x neighbourhood effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Weighted Yes  Yes  Yes  
N 7,871  7,871  7,871  
r2 0.923  0.923  0.923  
Notes: Model (1) is model (5) in Table 3 in the main paper, showing additional parameter estimates. Unit of obser-
vation is transactions. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual 
characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness can range from -
2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). 
Conservation area (CA) / View / Buffer is a dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation 
areas / outside CA with a view on buildings inside CA / within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside CA. Controls 
include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a property 
is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached 
house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, 
the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail 
station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local 
schools. Crime controls includes density of the following crimes: Anti-social behaviour, property crime, vi-
olent crime, theft. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to CA boundary 
trends (0 at boundary). Observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a neigh-
bourhood. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
In column (2) we additionally allow for an interaction effect between the differenced distinctive-
ness score and differenced income and differenced degree share. This is to allow the design effect 
to vary in income and education levels. The results do not support that the design effect varies 
Ahlfeldt / Holman –Distinctively Different – Appendix 20 
 
significantly in these variables and the conservation area design capitalisation effects is reduced 
marginally only. In column (3) we present a very demanding model in which we allow the design 
effect to vary in all socio-economic variables. In this model the conservation area design capitali-
sation effect is reduced by about one third and just about statistically insignificant (at the 10% 
level). Briefly summarised, we find evidence for design-based sorting, but limited evidence that 
the estimated premium is primarily driven by this sorting. 
Controlling for crime hardly affects the design effect. This is in line with differenced crime densi-
ties not being strongly correlated with differenced distinctiveness scores as shown in Table A8. 
Thus, it does not seem as if crime and anti-social behaviour are more or less likely to occur in 
more or less distinctive areas. 
Tab. A8. Differenced Neighbourhood Variables vs. Differenced Distinctiveness Score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 ∆ ln Crime 
density: 
All re-
ported 
crimes 
∆ ln Crime 
density: 
Anti-social 
behaviour 
∆ ln Crime 
density: 
Property 
crime 
∆ ln Crime 
density: 
Violent 
crimes 
∆ ln Crime 
density: 
Theft 
∆ Degree 
share (%) 
∆ Income 
(in 1000 
£) 
∆ distinctiveness 
score (adjusted) 
-0.133 
(0.129) 
-0.058 
(0.177) 
0.000 
(0.126) 
-0.180 
(0.155) 
-0.226+ 
(0.152) 
8.277** 
(3.270) 
5.055** 
(2.203) 
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 
r2 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.011 0.030 0.141 0.135 
Notes:  Unit of observation is neighbourhood. ∆ ln crimes, ∆ income and ∆ degree share are expressed as differences 
between the means of these variables across transactions within an inside and an outside 250m buffer 
drawn around a conservation area (CA) boundary. Income data merged to transactions are Experian esti-
mates of the median household income in a census ward. Degree shares merged to transactions are from 
the 2001 census and available at the output area level. ∆ distinctiveness score is the neighbourhood effects 
controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinc-
tiveness can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive rela-
tive to surrounding areas). Standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. + p < 0.15, * p < 
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
4.4 Instrumental Variable Models 
In model (8) in Table 3 in the main paper we address the concern that it is potentially the same 
households who reported design scores and bought properties inside conservation areas. Unob-
served preference shocks could therefore introduce an endogeneity problem. Building on the ev-
idence provided in Figure 4 we use the year of designation of a conservation area and the density 
of listed buildings inside a conservation area, both interacted with the conservation area dummy, 
as instruments for the interaction of the CA dummy and the differenced distinctiveness score (CA 
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x ∆ distinctiveness score). While we limit the presentation of instrumental variable estimates to 
one model in the main paper to save space, we report a broader range of estimates here in Ta-
ble A9.  
Tab. A9. Distinctiveness Effects: Instrumental Variable Models (2SLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.212*** 
(0.080) 
0.221*** 
(0.082) 
0.119 
(0.207) 
0.156 
(0.201) 
View x ∆distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.065 
(0.046) 
0.082* 
(0.048) 
0.059 
(0.044) 
0.079+ 
(0.049) 
Buffer x ∆distinctiveness (adjusted) 0.001 
(0.050) 
0.002 
(0.050) 
-0.049 
(0.107) 
-0.033 
(0.106) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA distance x neighbourhood effects - - Yes Yes 
Weighted - Yes - Yes 
Kleinbergen Paap F-statistic 10.160 9.873 5.880 6.407 
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) 0.642 0.956 0.580 0.994 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
r2 0.728 0.719 0.721 0.713 
Notes:  Model (2) model (8) in Table 3 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transactions. Adjusted design indi-
ces are neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation of 
equation (5). Raw values are neighbourhood means across the scores reported by individuals. Reported ∆ 
design indices can range from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive 
relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area (CA) is a dummy variable identifying transactions inside 
CA. View is a dummy variable identifying transactions outside CA with a view on buildings inside CA. Buffer 
is dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside CA. Controls include 
building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a property is new, 
sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached house, is a 
terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, the nearest 
natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail station, the 
nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local schools. CA 
distance x Neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to conservation area boundary 
trends (0 at boundary). Instruments for CA x ∆ distinctiveness are CA x year of conservation area designa-
tion and CA x natural log of listed building density within the respective conservation area. CA distance x 
neighbourhood effects partialled out from other variables to ensure that the covariance matrix of orthogo-
nality conditions is full rank. Observations are weighted inversely to the number of observations in a neigh-
bourhood in (2) and (4). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 0.15, * p 
< 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
We find that in models excluding boundary distance effects (columns 1-2) the conservation area 
distinctiveness effect tends to be larger than in the baseline model. Conditional on boundary dis-
tance effects (column 3-4), the conservation area distinctiveness effect is smaller, but within the 
same range as in the respective model in Table 2 in the main paper. The distinctiveness effect, 
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however, is not statistically significant due to large standard errors, probably because the instru-
ments are weak in these models (KP F-stat<6.5). Overall, the results suggest that the results are 
not driven by unobserved preference shocks. 
4.5 Distance Weighted Models  
In model (9) of Table 3 in the main paper we employ an alternative approach to ensure that iden-
tification of conservation area distinctiveness effect originates from changes in prices at conser-
vation area boundaries. Instead of controlling for boundary distance trends, we weight observa-
tions according to their proximity to the boundary. We use a standard Gaussian kernel with a 
bandwidth of 21.33 meters, which select following Silverman (1986). In Table A10 below we ex-
periment with a broad range of bandwidths ranging from 10m to 250m. The results prove to be 
very insensitive to the choice of bandwidths.  
Tab. A10. Distance Weighted Models 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.183** 
(0.077) 
0.186*** 
(0.035) 
0.165*** 
(0.031) 
0.170*** 
(0.037) 
0.167*** 
(0.040) 
0.164*** 
(0.041) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neighbourhood effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View area excluded Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weighted Inverse neighbourhood transactions x inverse distance from CA 
Bandwidth (meters) 10 25 50 100 150 250 
N 4,878 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 7,057 
r2 0.960 0.938 0.926 0.921 0.919 0.918 
Notes: Baseline model is model (9) in Table 3 in the main paper. Unit of observation is transaction. Conservation 
area (CA) is a dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation areas. ∆ distinctiveness (ad-
justed) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the estimation 
of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness ranges from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surrounding 
areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Controls include building age, floor space, the 
number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a property is new, sells under leasehold, has a 
garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached house, is a terraced house, the distance 
to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, the nearest natural nature reserve, the 
nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail station, the nearest underground sta-
tion, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local schools.  Observations are weighted 
inversely to the number of observations in a neighbourhood multiplied by a kernel function that decreases 
in distance from the conservation area boundary on either side (Gaussian kernel). Optimal bandwidth is 
21.33 meters (Silverman rule). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on neighbourhoods. + p < 
0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4.6 Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
Arguably, the first-order problem with standard errors in specification (6) is that the identifying 
variation in the design score stems from neighbourhoods, while the unit of observation is trans-
actions. To avoid deflation of standard errors, we cluster standard errors on neighbourhood level 
in our benchmark specifications. The comparison between columns (1) and (2) in Table A11 re-
veals that accounting for the clustered nature of the data increases the estimated standard errors, 
even though the significance levels are not affected substantially.  
There is the additional concern that our design measures are “generated regressors”. To account 
for the uncertainty that arises from having to estimate the first-stage we implement a bootstrap-
ping procedure. In column (3) we draw bootstrap (with replacement) samples from the first stage 
in 1,000 replications and use the distribution of second stage point estimates to compute the sig-
nificance levels. This procedure results in relatively narrow standard errors and high significance 
levels. Reassuringly, the placebo Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness effect still remains insignificant. In the 
remaining models we, in addition, also block bootstrap (clustering at the neighbourhood level) 
the second stage. With this procedure the resulting standard errors are within close range, but 
consistently smaller than in the corresponding models with clustered errors.  
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Tab. A11. Distinctiveness Effects: Bootstrapped Standard Errors 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Ln rice Ln rice Ln rice Ln rice Ln rice Ln rice Ln price 
CA x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.168*** 
(0.047) 
0.168** 
(0.064) 
0.168*** 
(0.025) 
0.168*** 
(0.063) 
0.160*** 
(0.049) 
0.134** 
(0.055) 
0.230** 
(0.103) 
View x ∆ distinctiveness  
(adjusted) 
0.081* 
(0.043) 
0.081* 
(0.048) 
0.081*** 
(0.022) 
0.081* 
(0.046) 
0.074+ 
(0.049) 
0.061 
(0.046) 
0.112 
(0.132) 
Buffer x ∆ distinctiveness (ad-
justed) 
-0.028 
(0.042) 
-0.028 
(0.059) 
-0.028 
(0.024) 
-0.028 
(0.049) 
-0.020 
(0.048) 
-0.042 
(0.041) 
-0.054 
(0.126) 
CA dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neigh. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA distance x neigh. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes - 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Sample All All All All All All Non-his-
toric pre-
designation 
Standard errors Robust Clus-
tered 
Bootstr. 
1st 
stage 
Bootst. 
1st stage 
& 2nd 
stage 
Bootstr. 
1st stage 
& 2nd 
stage 
Bootstr. 
1st stage 
& 2nd 
stage 
Boot-
strapped 
1st stage & 
2nd stage 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 1,127 
r2 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.919 0.915 0.917 0.959 
Notes: Unit of observation is transactions. Model (2) is the baseline model from Table 2, column (4) in the main 
paper. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics 
recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness ranges from -2 (not at all distinc-
tive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Conservation area 
(CA) is a dummy variable identifying transactions inside conservation areas. View is a dummy variable 
identifying transactions outside conservation areas with a view on buildings inside conservation areas. 
Buffer is dummy variable identifying transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside conservation 
areas. Controls include building age, floor space, the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, 
whether a property is new, sells under leasehold, has a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a 
semi-detached house, is a terraced house, the distance to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of out-
standing beauty, the nearest natural nature reserve, the nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust 
stop, the nearest rail station, the nearest underground station, and a distance-weighted measure of average 
test scores at local schools. CA distance x neighbourhood effects are neighbourhood specific distance to CA 
boundary trends (0 at boundary). Observations in (1-5) and (7) are weighted by the inverse of the number 
of transaction in a neighbourhood. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are heteroscedasticity robust. 
Clustered standard errors are clustered on neighbourhoods. 1st stage bootstrapped standard errors in (3) 
are generated by bootstrapping samples of survey respondents (with replacement), placing the recovered 
design fixed effects second-stage price regressions in 1000 replications. 1st and 2nd stage bootstrapped 
standard errors, in addition, are block (clustered on neighbourhoods) bootstrapped (with replacement) in 
the second stage. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
4.7 Non-Linear Approximation of Distinctiveness Effect 
Throughout most of the main paper we remain restrictive with respect to the functional form of 
the price-design relationship. In Figure 8 of the main paper we present a transparent attempt to 
explore a potential non-linearity using neighbourhoods as a unit of analysis. Here, we provide a 
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complementary analysis at the transaction level based on our baseline capitalisation specification 
(6). To analyse the partial correlation between prices and the design interaction term we proceed 
as follows. First, we recover the residuals from the regression of the natural log of price against 
all covariates except the CA x ∆ Distinctiveness interaction term. Second, we recover the residuals 
from a regression of the CA x ∆ Distinctiveness interaction term against all other covariates. Third, 
we approximate the partial correlation by fitting polynomials of distinct orders and locally 
weighted regressions (LWR) into the residuals. We repeat the procedure for the View x ∆ Distinc-
tiveness interaction term. 
In Table A12 we report the resulting polynomial approximations up to order three of the conser-
vation area distinctiveness effect (1-3) and view area distinctiveness effect (4-6). We illustrate 
these polynomial fits along with a LWR approximation in Figure A7. Figure A7 is suggestive of a 
non-linear relationship in some parts of the distribution, in particular in segments that seem rel-
atively sparsely populated. To obtain a better impression of the overall distribution we compute 
the marginal effects from the third-order polynomial models in Table A12 (columns 3 and 6) and 
illustrate them in Figure A8. We find that the mean and median of the distribution of marginal 
conservation area design effects is slightly above the baseline estimate while the distribution of 
marginal view area design effects is centred on a value slightly below the baseline estimate. The 
marginal effects are generally within a narrow range for the vast majority of observations. Thus, 
we conclude that there is little evidence in support of a non-linearity in the design capitalisation 
effect, although we caution against over-interpreting this result given the limited number of 
neighbourhoods from which we identify. 
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Tab. A12. Distinctiveness Effects: Polynomial Approximations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆ Ln price  ∆ Ln price ∆ Ln price ∆ Ln price ∆ Ln price  ∆ Ln price 
Interaction effect CA CA CA View View View 
[∆ Distinctiveness  
(adjusted)]^1 
0.168*** 
(0.033) 
0.165*** 
(0.033) 
0.184*** 
(0.042) 
0.081*** 
(0.029) 
0.086*** 
(0.029) 
0.045 
(0.039) 
 [∆ Distinctiveness  
(adjusted)]^2 
 
 
-0.286* 
(0.169) 
-0.288* 
(0.169) 
 
 
-0.131* 
(0.073) 
-0.190** 
(0.082) 
 [∆ Distinctiveness  
(adjusted)]^3 
 
 
 
 
-0.451 
(0.599) 
 
 
 
 
0.264+ 
(0.167) 
CA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
View Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Buffer Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA x distinctiveness - - - Yes Yes Yes 
View x distinctiveness Yes Yes Yes - - - 
Buffer x distinctiveness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year x neigh. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CA dist. x neigh. effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Weighted Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
r2 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 
aic -3711.330 -3712.204 -3710.770 -3711.330 -3712.562 -3713.047 
Notes:  Baseline model is model (4) in Table 2. Models estimated using the Robinson procedure. Dependent variable 
is the residual from a regression of the natural log of sales price against all covariates except the one for 
which we report the coefficient in the table. Independent variable is the residual from the regression of the 
variable for which we report the coefficient against all other covariates. Conservation area (CA) / View / 
Buffer are dummy variables identifying transactions inside CA / transactions outside CA with a view on 
buildings inside CA / transactions within a 0-50 meter buffer area outside CA. CA x distinctiveness / View x 
distinctiveness / Buffer x distinctiveness are the same interacted with distinctiveness. ∆ distinctiveness 
(adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual characteristics recovered from the esti-
mation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness ranges from -2 (not at all distinctive relative to surround-
ing areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Controls include building age, floo r space, 
the number of bathrooms, the number of bedrooms, whether a property is new, sells under leasehold, has 
a garage, has central heating, is a detached house, is a semi-detached house, is a terraced house, the distance 
to the nearest natural park, the nearest area of outstanding beauty, the nearest natural nature reserve, the 
nearest lake, the nearest river, the nearest bust stop, the nearest rail station, the nearest underground sta-
tion, and a distance-weighted measure of average test scores at local schools. CA distance x neighbourhood 
effects are neighbourhood specific distance to CA boundary trends (0 at boundary). Observations are 
weighted by the inverse of the number of transaction in a neighbourhood. Standard errors (in parentheses) 
are heteroscedasticity robust. + p < 0.15, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Fig. A7. Distinctiveness Effects: Non-Linear Approximations 
 
Notes: Unit of observation is transaction. Figure shows non-linear approximations of the conditional relationship 
between natural log of prices and distinctiveness in differences across conservation area boundaries (left) 
and view area boundaries (right). First, the residuals from a regression of the natural log of sales price 
against all covariates except the interaction between CA (left) or View (right) and the differenced distinc-
tiveness score are recovered and plotted on the y-axis. Second, the residuals from the regression of CA (left) 
or View (right) and differenced distinctiveness score against all other covariates are recovered and plotted 
on the x-axis. ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) is the neighbourhood effects controlling for individual character-
istics recovered from the estimation of equation (5). Reported ∆ distinctiveness ranges from -2 (not at all 
distinctive relative to surrounding areas) to +2 (very distinctive relative to surrounding areas). Third, pol-
ynomial functions (based on estimates from Table A12) and locally weighted linear regressions are fitted 
to approximate the functional relationship between the recovered residuals. Locally weighted linear regres-
sions use a Gaussian Kernel with a bandwidth of 0.1.  
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Fig. A12. Marginal Distinctiveness Effects in Non-Linear Models (3rd Order Polynomial) 
 
Notes: Figure shows the marginal ∆ distinctiveness effects (adjusted) of the 3rd order polynomial models reported 
in Figure A7 and Table A12, column (3) and (6). The marginal effects are computed as ∑ 1/𝑜3𝑜=1  × ℵ?̂??̂?
𝑜, 
where ?̂? is the residual from the regression of CA (or View) x ∆ distinctiveness (adjusted) against all other 
covariates (used as dependent variable in Table A12) and ℵ?̂? is o-order polynomial parameter in Table A12. 
Kernel densities are computed over all observations within 1st-99th percentile the distribution of marginal 
effects to improve the readability of the graph. Means and medians are computed using the entire distribu-
tions.  
